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T. W. Wakeling* The Oral Component of
Appellate Work
I. Introduction
A. Anyone who haunts the courtrooms of North America will find
advocates of uneven quality. 1 There are master craftsmen but
alongside them labour colleagues blessed with skills which escape
the observer's scrutiny. Unfortunately, the latter category has been
the subject of considerable attention lately with the result there is the
impression about that poor advocates have cornered a dispropor-
tionate share of the market. 2 Even Canadian and American judges
have felt it necessary to question the competence of some
practioners.3
Chief Justice Burger directed his serious charges at the trial
lawyers but the appellate bar, the subject of this study, has been the
target of the odd judicial barb. Judge Wilkins sums up this
disenchantment with his complaint that the bar's oral abilities are
*T. W. Wakeling, Assistant Professor of Law, University of Saskatchewan.
1. See Rall, Effective OralArgument, [1952] U. I11. L.F. 114. Other discoveries
will be more startling, for if Fry v. Lebold (1939), 31 N.E. 2d 257 (Ohio Ct. App.)
is a guide, most anything can happen. Counsel seranaded the jury and the
spectators, and of one lawyer, the reviewing court noted, "Mr. Walter Ruff played
many parts. He bewailed his fate in tragic manner not unworthy of King Lear." Id.
at 258. Of course, counsel need not be the center of attention. See Regina v.
Bevacqua (1970), 11 C.R.N.S. 76 (Ont. C.A.) for the remarks of a provincial court
judge, characterized by the Ontario Court of Appeal as "simply beyond
comprehension". Id. at 78
2. See Wilkins, The Argument of an Appeal (1970), 55 Mass. L.Q. 115 at 119
3. Id. Mr. Justice Stratton of the New Brunswick Supreme Court has complained
about the quality of today's advocates. The Canadian Bar Association, 5 National,
Sept.-Oct. 1978, at 12. Chief Justice Burger of the United States Supreme Court
has voiced criticism as well. Newsweek, Dec. 11, 1978, at 98-100. In the same vein
Chief Justice Wilkins observed, "Appellate argument resembles great literature.
Almost anyone has some critical competence, but only the few achieve a standard
of performance which the many sense." Id. Mr. Medina, of the New York bar
makes the point this way: "An appellant should always argue .... The fact that a
large number of oral arguments are futile and a mere waste of time is beside the
point." (1934), 20 A.B.A.J. 139 at 140. Mr. Rall attributes the advent of timed
oral presentations in the United States, in part, to the Bar's inability to usefully
employ oral argument. Rall, supra, note 1. Mr. Davis might not agree with this
explanation for modem economies as he considers increased work loads the
primary factor. Davis, The Argument of an Appeal, (1940), 26 A.B.A.J. 895; see
Wilkins, supra, note 2 at 115-16
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their "least qualitative accomplishments". 4 Given the prominent
place these skills assume in the appellate chambers this is a stinging
indictment.
However, this plaintive cry does not mean that each community
is without its luminaries but rather should be interpreted as a
lamentation that there are not more of them. 5 It is the adoption of
this emphasis which explains the emergence of appellate advocacy
courses in North American law schools and encourages students of
the art of advocacy. Underlying such enterprises is the assumption
that industrious lawyers can develop the pleader's talents, for in the
words of Professor Weiner, "there is nothing mysterious or esoteric
about the business of making an effective oral presentation."
' 6
Prominent academics, judges, and lawyers must share this belief for
what other explanation is there for the fact that leading counsel have
throughout the ages recorded their views on the topic.7
4. Supra, note 2
5. Weiner, OralAdvocacy (1948), 62 Harv. L. Rev. 56
6. Id. at 57. Mr. Maloney, Q.C. would probably agree for he regards his
conversations with acknowledged experts as an important part of his education. He
must believe that they had something concrete to pass on. Advocacy (1978), 12 L.
Soc'y Upper Can. Gazette 114. But see O'Driscoll, The Presentation of an Appeal
to the Court of Appeal and to the Supreme Court of Canada in a Criminal Case,
[1969] Special Lectures of the Law Society of Upper Canada 203
7. See, e.g., S. T. Bigelow, Legal Etiquette and Court-Room Decorum (Toronto:
Carswell, 1955); Board of Student Advisors Harvard Law School, Introduction to
Advocacy (1970); F. Cooper, Writing in Law Practice (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merril,
1963); E. Re, Brief Writing and Oral Argument (4th ed. New York: Dobbs Ferry,
1974); M. Rombauer, Legal Problem Solving: Analysis, Research and Writing
(2nd ed. St. Paul, Minn.: West, 1973); Appleman, The Written Argument on
Appeal (1965), 41 Notre Dame Law 40; Anderson, Briefs and Arguments That
Help the Courts (1943), 17 Tenn. L. Rev. 691; Barry, The Ethics of Advocacy
(1941), 15 Austl. L.J. 166; Currie, Some Aspects of Appellate Practice Before the
Wisconsin Supreme Court, [1955] Wis. L. Rev. 554; Davis, supra, note 3;
Denecke, Clarke & Levin, Notes on Appellate Brief Writing (1972), 51 Ore. L.
Rev. 351 [hereinafter cited as Denecke]; Freedman, On Advocacy (1956), 1 Vill.
L. Rev. 290; Gordon, Techniques in Oral Advocacy, [1964] Wis. L. Rev. 445;
Hiscock, The Court of Appeals of New York: Some Features of Its Organization
and Work (1929), 14 Cornell L.Q. 131; Jackson, Advocacy Before the Supreme
Court: Suggestions for Effective Case Presentations (1951), 37 A.B.A.J. 801;
Kaufman, Appellate Advocacy in the Federal Courts (1978), 79 F.R.D. 165;
Levitan, Confidential Chat on the Craft of Briefing, [1957] Wis. L. Rev. 59;
Loughran, The Argument of an Appeal in the Court ofAppeals (1943), 12 Fordham
L. Rev. 1; Macmillan, Some Observations on the Art of Advocacy (1935), 13 Can.
Bar Rev. 22; Maloney, supra, note 6; Medina, supra, note 3; O'Driscoll, supra,
note 6; Rail, supra, note 1; Robinette, A Counsel Looks at the Court (1975), 53
Can. B. Rev. 558; The Art of Advocacy (1943), 107 Just. P. 519; Weiner, supra,
note 5; Wilkins, supra, note 2; B.C. Committee for the Seminar on Advocacy in
the Supreme Court of Canada (1976)
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B. Because there is not a perfect identity between ability and
experience, the model on this essay is the outstanding counsellor, as
opposed to the weathered veteran. 8 Senior lawyers have delivered
many memorable arguments but the explanation for the indelible
impression is not always the expertise displayed. Sometimes, it is
the total lack thereof which is breathtaking. Experience is
undoubtedly a great teacher yet it may be counterproductive if what
has been cultivated and refined are bad habits. The point is that
excellence is the product of the diligent study and application of
sound principles, not simply the accumulation of time logged in
appellate courts. Accordingly, the accomplished artisan, whether
senior or not, is the norm.
Now it is probably true, as Mr. O'Driscoll, Q.C. asserts, that
"[t]here are . . . as many ways of presenting an appeal as there are
advocates", 9 but this cannot mean that all modes are equally
desirable or meritorious. Golfers strike the ball with a bewildering
variety of styles yet most would concede that Arnold Palmer or Jack
Nicklaus have the most effective format. As in golf, there are, in
appellate advocacy, clear bases for preferring some approaches over
others, and consequently, questionable practices must be identified
as such, just as a lighthouse warns searfaring types that danger
lurks, even if it is not apparent on the surface.
This article studies the oral presentation component of appellate
advocacy but on occasion the interdependance of the oral and
written element will emerge, and observations applicable to one will
govern both forms of communication. But regardless of the medium
utilized, the communicator's message will be lost if the receiver's
interest is not aroused.' 0 In the rarefied atmosphere of the court of
errors this means that everything which the advocate does should be
designed to galvanize the judges, the piscatorial figures in Mr.
Davis' apt analogy of the angler and the fish." This directive
determines what arguments will be selected and the order in which
8. But see Anderson id.; Maloney, supra, note 6. Senior members are not the only
practitioners who have received the approbation of appellate courts. For example,
Mr. Justice Arnup described Mr. Gold's argument as a powerful one "attractively
presented" in Regina v. Shand (1976), 30 C.C.C. 2d 23 at 35 (Ont. C.A.)
9. O'Driscoll, supra, note 6. Judge Loughran confirms the existence of certain
intangibles such as looks or manners which are certainly unique to the individual.
Supra, note 7 at 7
10. Wilkins, supra, note 2 at 119. LOrd Macmillan said that "[t] o be interesting is
almost as important as to be logical." Supra, note 7 at 29
11. Supra, note 3
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they will appear as well as the body movements and words which
will best articulate the chosen concepts.
C. A narrow forensic focus reflects a conscious decision to study a
discernible skill of considerable importance to the judicial process
but it does not suggest that the attorney's persuasive powers are the
profession's exclusively or that the courtroom and the social arenas
share no common traits. Neither of those propositions are true.
Since an advocate is any person "who speaks or writes in support of
something" 12 it is apparent that the lawyers do not monopolize the
traits. Clearly the art of persuasion 13 is a characteristic displayed by
many disgruntled spouses, hopeful salespersons and capable
teachers. Because all advocates are not attorneys the lawyer has
much to learn from the perceptive layman. 
14
At the same time, certain features of the lawyer-advocate's
experience are unique for the forum he appears in is presided over
by an impartial decision maker appointed by the state with the
authority to decide very significant issues. Other differences also
exist which justify a special interest in the appellate process. An
advocate, whether lawyer or layman, shares a common interest in
that they desire the recognition of their position, but with the lawyer
that end is a judicial conclusion which will advance the client's
interest. 15 There is another aspect of a lawyer's work which
distinguishes it from non legal efforts, which is the professional
responsibility owed to the state and court, as well as to the client. 16
For example, counsel is expected to act as an informal screening
process, and refrain from filing unmeritorious appeals. Thus,
although a barrister fervently hopes that the judges will side with his
client, 17 a principled practioner always has a higher goal in sight,
which is to participate in a rational process that will culminate in a
just and fair decision which reinforces the values of the rule of
12. Webster's New World Dictionary (Springfield, Mass.: Merriam, 1966)
13. Barry, supra, note 7 at 168; Macmillan, supra, note 7; Weiner, supra, note 5
at 57
14. Mr. S. Kujawa, Q.C. frequently regales his listeners with the wisdom of his
poker partners and how they have contributed to the odd appellate victory. Judge
Re believes "[h]elpful suggestions can be obtained from any intelligent person who
is willing to listen." Supra, note 7 at 187
15. Davis, supra, note 3; Freedman, supra, note 7 at 294; Macmillan, supra,
note 7
16. See Canadian Bar Association, Code of Professional Conduct (1974);
Appleman, supra, note 7 at 48; Kaufman, supra, note 7 at 166
17. Wilkins, supra, note 2 at 120; see Macmillan, supra, note 7
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law. 18
Judges and lawyers alike, as a unit, struggle for the best solution.
Those on both sides of the bench make their contribution and
without this co-operation the legal system will not attain its full
problem solving potential. 19 Unless all the complexities of a
proposition are unravelled and the merits of both sides ventilated, a
judge will entertain some reservations about the ultimate determina-
tion. A judge is certainly more confident if all the relevant
considerations are before him. 20 Furthermore, animated debate
saves the judge from undue identification with one side, which is a
danger if the judge must act as the surrogate advocate. 21 Appellate
judges have the final say in the legal drama but the advocates are
certainly a supporting cast, without whom, the show would not be
the same.
The advocate's job then is to forcefully state his client's interest.
How crucial this role is becomes apparent from the following
passage which chronicles the conduct of Mr. Ivan C. Rand, in his
days as commission counsel for the Canadian National Railways:
[Rand] confessed that on occasion, in the course of an application
to the Railway Transport Board for leave to discontinue some
local rail facility which had, insofar as the Railway was
concerned, become redundant, it appeared to him that the local
interest was not being adequately represented. In those
circumstances, Rand felt obligated to say what could be said on
the other side of the issue and, it is reported, he sometimes
presented the case so vigorously that the ultimate decision of the
Board went against the Railway. 22
An outstanding advocate will understand the fundamental
importance of his role and let that govern the quality of the work
18. See Barry, supra, note 7 at 167. As an officer of the court the advocate is
obliged to play a role in the law making process. Appleman, supra, note 7 at 48.
See also Freedman, supra, note 7 at 292; Jackson, supra, note 7 at 863
19. Kaufman, supra, note 7 at 165. Sometimes counsel's factum and the courts
opinion share similar features. Cooper, supra, note 7 at 37. Mr. O'Driscoll, Q.C.
opined, "I suppose one of the nicest compliments that a counsel can receive from a
court is when the reasons for judgment bear a strong resemblance to the wording of
the factum." Supra, note 6 at 204
20. Davis, supra, note 3 at 896; c.f. Jackson, supra, note 7 at 863. Even full
argument does not rid the court of doubts. Mr. Justice Laskin said of second doubts
that "they are endemic in judicial office." Spataro v. The Queen (1972), 7 C.C.C.
2d 1 at 14 (S.C.C.). See Jackson, supra, note 7 at 863
21. Kaufman, supra, note 7 at 165-66
22. Pollock, Mr. Justice Rand; A Triumph of Principle (1975), 53 Can.B.Rev.
519 at 520
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product.2 3 To Mr. Justice Jackson's mind the exceptional lawyer
accepts the function of a cathedral builder and eschews the notion
that the task is akin to a stone mason's.
2 4
The courts, the workplace of judges and advocates, are there to
fashion remedies the protoganists themselves are unable to
discover. But the opinion will have ramifications which affect more
than the disputants, for specific facts introduce abstract principles
which affect interests beyond those of the immediate parties.
2 5 Most
cases will not arouse the national interest as Morgentaler v.
Regina2 6 did in Canada, or Brown v. Board of Education2 7 did in
the United States, but even those carrying a lower level of public
interest display the trait mentioned above. For this reason, an
advocate must be cognizant of this high duty, for its breach damages
not only the client, but those in comparable positions as well, and
society as a whole labors under a deficient regime if the errors are of
signal importance.
2 8
In summary then, the decision maker and the advocate have
mutually constructive roles to play. Together, through interchange
of opinion, oral and written, the participants strive for a fair and
sensible solution to the matter at hand.2 9 The leading feature of this
colloquy is active intellectual participation. 3 0 Both counsel and the
23. Those without this appreciation will hopefully be motivated by the fact that
appellate work is an infrequent occurrence for them. Appleman, supra, note 7 at
48. The fear of facing the unsuccessful client might affect others. See Jackson,
supra, note 7 at 802
24. Supra, note 7 at 864
25. Freedman, supra, note 7 at 291. See Radin, Case Law and Stare Decisis:
Concerning Prajudizienrecht in Amerika, in Essays on Jurisprudence from the
Columbia Law Review 3 (1963)
26. (1975), 20C.C.C. 2d449(S.C.C.)
27. (1954), 347 U.S. 483
28. Unskilled advocates tax the system, and it is questionable whether incompetent
judges or counsel provide the greatest handicaps. If advocates must educate the
judges, then arguably deficient counsel represents the greatest hazard. See
Loughran, supra, note 7 at 7. A superb judge will survive a bout with the flatulence
of inferior counsel, but must decide the issue without the valuable insights a
proponent of one side may have. Excellent counsel may lead a judge of
questionable talent but there is always the danger the court will not properly
identify the side with the expertise.
29. Gordon, supra, note 7 at 446
30. An effective argument assumes both parties have knowledge of the matter
discussed. That is why it is improper to discuss cases opposing counsel has no
reason to suspect will be called in aid. There are, of course, exceptions, such as a
recent decision not previously available, or the other side's indication the case
might be of some assistance in argument. Rombauer, supra, note 7 at 180
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court must adopt an inquisitive stance and advance meritorious
propositions for consideration. 3 ' That Mr. Justice Frankfurter
favored a charged environment is apparent from this tribute to a
former law clerk of his: "He respected the traditions of the Supreme
Court as a tribunal not designed as a dozing audience for the reading
of soliloquies but as a questioning body, utilizing all arguments as a
means for exposing the difficulties of the case with a view to
meeting them." ' 32 It follows then that although the judges' views
carry the day, counsel must consider himself the intellectual equal
of the bench, for without this orientation, counsel, awestruck by the
surroundings and the eminence of the judges, will not adequately
fulfill the advocate's role. 33 If counsel has "a litter of intellectual
kittens" the process is short circuited. 34 That probably explains
Chief Judge Pound's statement to a nervous tyro, "Don't forget that
you are talking to seven ordinary men like yourself." 35 Thus, an
advocate should be instructive without being condescending,
respectful without being obsequious, and forceful without being
obnoxious.36
II. Orientation
An advocate who understands the importance of the rule of law and
the crucial functions performed by judges and lawyers will
recognize the need for all participants to be courteous and
respectful. 3 7 Disagreements are expected but animosity has no place
in a setting which thrives on rationality. Personal slights never pass
for sound argument.
Neither counsel nor the judges should display anything but a
gentlemanly manner. 38 Chief Justice Duff was ever the gentleman
and on his retirement, the Canadian Bar Association complimented
him on this attribute in these words: "No case has ever suffered
through the inexperience of its pleader. No pleader has ever
appeared here who has not been afforded full opportunity, indeed
31. Gordon, supra, note 7 at 446
32. Frankfurter, Of Law and Men 321 (1956) in Gordon, supra, note 7
33. Weiner, supra, note 5 at 72-73
34. Id. at 73
35. Loughran, supra, note 7 at 7
36. Rail, supra, note 1 at 131
37. Kaufman, supra, note 7 at 172; Macmillan, supra, note 7 at 30
38. Macmillan, supra, note 7 at 30; Maloney, supra, note 6 at 144; Rall, supra,
note 1 at 131. The judges of the Supreme Court of Canada have an excellent
reputation in this regard. Robinette, supra, note 7
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who has not been patiently guided and helped, to make full
demonstration of his case." 39 But this precept has not always been
obeyed, and the embarrassment associated with personal attack is
evident. Lord Thurlow, the Lord Chancellor in the reign of George
III, had to decide if a death occurred, and in response to counsel's
observation that he had seen his client lying in his casket, retorted,
"Good Heavens, sir! Why did you not tell me that before? I should
not have doubted the fact one moment, for I think nothing can be
more likely to kill a man than to have you for an attorney."
40
Neither judges nor pleaders should engage in conduct this
discordant, and counsel certainly gains nothing from defaming
fellow advocates or belittling lower courts. 4 1 An appellate forum is
not the place to air personal disputes, for not only is it in poor
taste,4 2 but it introduces an irrelevant consideration which is devoid
of persuasive value,4 3 and annoys judges who do not, as a rule,
condone slights given their brethren. 44 Judge Anderson records the
disfavor an over zealous advocate risks: "Such attempts leave a bad
impression, and are never made by an astute lawyer."
45
Obviously, as a matter of tactics, counsel refrains from conduct
which will displease the court. 4 6 As judges are keenly aware of the
need to be impartial and to be so regarded, they do not enjoy
compliments. Such commendation may well be a sincere expression
of respect but it can place judges in an awkward position,
39. Remarks of Mr. E. Phillipe Brais, K.C. in Campbell, The Right Honorable Sir
Lyman Poore Duff, P.C., G.C.M.G.: The Man As I Knew Him (1974), 12 Osgoode
Hall L.J. 243 at 251
40. L.J. Bigelow, Bench and Bar: A Complete Digest of The Wit, Humor,
Asperities and Amenities of the Law (Reprint New York: Harper, 1970) at 37; see
also S. Jackson, Laughter at Law (1970) at 76. Equally offensive is this judicial
remark prompted by the attorney of record's absence, and the prosecutor's
explanation that defence counsel was delayed because of a murder trial in a higher
court: "No doubt his own."
41. See Weiner, supra, note 5 at 63
42. Anderson, supra, note 7 at 704
43. Davis, supra, note 3 at 898
44. Id.
45. Supra, note 5 at 704-05. Counsel who opened in this form, "My lords, this is
an appeal from the judgment of Mr. Justice Kekewich but I hasten to add that this is
not my only ground of appeal.", may have scored well under the heading of
"Interest Arousal" but probably escaped unscathed only because none of the
likeable justice's friends heard the appeal. S. Jackson, supra, note 40 at 83-84.
Ridicule is a prohibited weapon. Levitan, supra, note 7 at 66
46. A judge who is troubled might not give his full attention to the arguments.
Counsel's attire then should not divert the court from the contentious issue and
should mirror the importance of the process. See Jackson, supra, note 7 at 862
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jeopardizing in the eyes of some observers their indifference in the
cause. 47 Therefore, consummate tacticians never compliment a
justice for such accolades often embarrass the recipient and irritate
his brethren.48 If the opinion of a sitting judge is useful, counsel
discusses it, but in a manner suitable for any other work.
49
Judges undoubtedly wish to be held in high esteem by members
of the bar, but the appellate oral presentation is not the time to
deliver plaudits. 50
While hearings are formal occasions, serious because of the
interests at stake, they need not be sterile and solemn. Normal
persons labor under physical limitations and periods of intense
concentration necessitate relief. Thus felicitous humor is
welcome, 51 although some dissenting voices can be heard. 52 It is
Lord Macmillan's opinion that humor "has a curious and almost
incalculable psychological effect" 53 and Lord Chief Justice Erle
affirms that "[tihe court is very much obliged to any learned
gentleman who beguiles the tedium of legal argument with a little
honest hilarity. '154
The benefits of a humorous assertion or response are identifiable.
47. This sensitivity no doubt explains some vitriolic reactions prompted by rather
innocuous compliments which touched judicial nerves. Remember Lord Hewart's
words in The King v. Sussex Judges, ex p. McCarthy, [1924] 1 K.B. 256 at 259
that it "is of fundamental importance that justice should not only be done, but
should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done."
48. Ral, supra, note 1 at 131. Judicial modesty is by no means uniform but the
general rule is a good one.
49. Jackson, supra, note 7 at 804
50. See Rall,supra, note 1 at 131
51. Freedman, supra, note 7 at 298. Expert advocates realize though that there can
be too much of a good thing.
52. As a critic Dean Prosser looks with some disfavor on legal levity: "Judicial
humor is a dreadful thing. In the first place, the jokes are usually bad, I have
seldom heard a judge utter a good one. . . . In the second place, the bench is not an
appropriate place for unseemly levity. The litigant has vital interests at stake."
Preface to The Judicial Humorist at vii (Prosser ed. 1952). The first observation is a
matter of personal opinion but the Dean's remarks assume the lighter moments are
without value unless terribly funny. That would be valid from an entertainment
perspective but that is not the approach to consider. The proper question is, does
legal humor contribute to a full hearing of the question. For the reasons asserted in
the text an affirmative answer is justifiable. The caution of Sir Gervais Rentoul,
K.C. is well taken: "Humour must be sparingly used even if at times it serves a
useful purpose; facetiousness is not to be encouraged, because the issues are
generally too serious a matter for the parties." The Art of Advocacy, supra, note 7
53. Macmillan, supra, note 7 at 27
54. L. J. Bigelow, supra, note 40 at 373
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Lord Macmillan believes it dissolves tension. 55 A point humorously
made will not quickly be forgotten. 5 6 Erskine possessed this flair for
one writer commented that "he was perpetually winning men's
opinions by tickling their sense of humour." 5 7 A clever remark will
certainly give one the court's attention for the upcoming argument.
No appellate court could ignore an opening like this: "My lords,
this is an appeal from the judgment of Mr. Justice Kekewich but I
hasten to add that this is not my only ground of appeal. ",58 Humor is
suspect though when used in a personal way. Personal affronts are
disruptive of the process and the same is true whether humorous or
not. The following jibe, uttered by Serjeant Davy 59 while in the
west country, runs afoul of this directive: "The farther I journeyed
toward the West, the more convinced I was that the wise men came
from the East."
60
A timely barb can undo a specious argument. As well, laughter
can sometimes give counsel. time to fashion the proper response
which will answer a judicial question or defuse a potentially
dangerous situation. 6 1 It is effective then as a disguised plea for
time. Furthermore, a humorous incident shared by counsel and the
court symbolizes the common purpose and origin of the
participants. This identity was apparent to those who observed
Professor Norman's argument in Harelkin v. University of
Regina,62 a case involving a discharged student in the school of
social work. The appellant encountered judicial turbulence at the
outset and Mr. Justice Spence finally leaned forward and asked
Professor Norman, counsel for the appellant, if it was his position
55. Supra, note 7 at 27
56. See Freedman, supra, note 7 at 298
57. L.J. Bigelow, supra, note 40 at 52
58. S. Jackson, supra, note 40 at 83-84
59. There are no serjeants today. A serjeant stood somewhere between Q.C.'s and
the rest of the bar. Megarry, A Second Miscellany-at-law (London: Stevens, 1973)
at 22
60. L.J. Bigelow, supra, note 40 at 99
61. Some judges tend to capitulize the advocate's position and by doing so, trap
unwary counsel should agreement be expressed with the court's restatement.
Placed in such a quandary Edinborough's onetime Dean of the Faculty of
Advocates responded, "My Lord, while fully appreciating the benevolence which
has prompted your Lordship to come to my assistance, may I be permitted, for
reasons which your Lordship will understand, to state my case in my own way."
Macmillan, supra, note 7 at 28. Mr. O'Driscoll, Q.C. cautions counsel against an
inconsidered concurrence. Supra, note 6 at 211
62. (S.C.C. March 30, 1979) (unreported)
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that one had to be neurotic to be a social worker. A slight smile
accompanied the delightful response, "My lord, I do not think I
have to make that point to carry the day." ' 63 Levity may also stamp
the advocate as an objective participant, able, with some
detachment, to see the lighter side of the controversy.
6 4
A humorous sally is often spontaneous or even inadvertent but
there is nothing objectionable about preconceived efforts. In fact,
the court's best known wit, Lord Darling, was at his best after
careful consideration of the appropriate line.
65
Again, the formal nature of the surroundings will dictate the
forms of expression employed, but counsel should not forego
colloquialisms when the context makes it the most attractive mode
of communication. Counsel who stated "My opponent is spitting
into a rather strong wind" has memorably reminded the court that
precedents favor the speaker's position. 66 Communication is of
course advanced when the participants have a large vocabulary to
draw on, but an appellate hearing is not an invitation to parade one's
learning. Rather, an advocate uses words to transmit concepts
which advance his client's position, not his own standing.
Unless counsel is relaxed, satisfied with the preparatory work,
useful energy will be tapped by nervous needs. 6 7 The best advocates
have confidence in their abilities and this allows them to participate
fully in the process. As they are comfortable in their surroundings,
the likelihood they will be themselves increases, which in turn frees
all their resources for the tasks at hand. The court senses this
confidence and is attentive. 68 Without this boldness, the advocate
63. This is the writer's record of the exchange which Professor K. E. Norman has
confirmed.
64. Freedman, supra, note 7 at 298-99
65. Mr. Jackson suspected "that his more literary quips were cooked over the
midnight oil and served fresh and piping hot in Court the next morning." Supra,
note 40 at 26
66. Gordon, supra, note 7 at 452
67. Counsel who worry about inadequate research efforts always wonder if
something crucial has been omitted. Such doubts plague most advocates but
undermines the confidence of those with genuine reservations. As a result counsel
constantly anticipate the imminent destruction of their position, which impairs their
effectiveness as forceful advocates. To combat disconcerting doubts a smart
pleader will thoroughly research his problem.
68. Freedman, supra, note 7 at 295. The best advocates let their own characters
stamp their work.
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who is well read,6 9 imaginative, 70 has "a catholicity of interest", 71
and an excellent command of the English language will labor under
a self imposed handicap, his full powers never unfettered.
III. Value of Oral Presentation
Counsel commit a grievous error if they underestimate the value of
an effective oral presentation. 72 Even in the United States where
strict time limits are observed, judges and lawyers have regularly
proclaimed the multiple virtues of oral argument. 73 An American
Supreme Court justice has acknowledged that the Court relies
"heavily on oral presentation", 74 and with reference to the
Canadian court of last resort Mr. Robinette, Q.C. maintains that
"[t]he court has always recognized the extreme importance of oral
argument." ' 75 Chief Justice Laskin has certainly revealed his
preference for the "spoken word." ' 76 Mr. Justice Jackson's
69. Lord Macmillan believes that outstanding pleaders have filled their minds
"with the treasures of our great literary inheritance". Supra, note 7 at 28-29. See
Jackson, supra, note 7 at 863. Mr. Justice Frankfurter must have had the same
convictions for he advised a young man readying himself for the study of the law to
read good books, view superb paintings and live life to the full. Letter reproduced
in Maloney, supra, note 6 at 148
70. Imagination is an invaluable asset in all court work. Freedman, supra, note 7
at 296-97
71. Diverse interests lead to balanced judgments. Jackson, supra, note 7 at 863.
"He will draw inspiration not alone from the literature of the law but from the
classics, history, the essay, the drama and poetry as well." Id. Mr. Justice Jackson
might well have had Chief Justice Duff in mind when composing that list. For a
description of Chief Justice Duff s extensive interests see Campbell, supra, note 39
at 250-51
72. Ineffective pleaders though are a problem. An Illinois judge complains "that
many lawyers merely read from their briefs and I consider oral arguments a waste
of the court's time in most instances." Rail, supra, note 1 at 117 n.23
73. Currie, supra, note 7 at 561; Davis, supra, note 3 at 896; Freedman, supra,
note 4 at 302; Gordon, supra, note 7 at 445; Hiscock, supra, note 7 at 139;
Loughran, supra, note 7 at 6; Medina, supra, note 3 at 140; Weiner, supra, note 5
at 59
74. Jackson, supra, note 7. Not all American federal appeals courts consider oral
argument absolutely essential to a full hearing, but the second circuit does.
Kaufman, supra, note 7 at 171. Because the English make little use of written
material marathon oral presentations are not uncommon in the House of Lords and
the Privy Council. Days and weeks can be devoted to counsel reading aloud to the
court. Karlen, Appeals in England and the United States (1962), 78 Law Q. Rev.
371 reproduced in D. Karlen & C. Joiner, Trials and Appeals: Cases and Materials
(1971) at 457
75. Robinette, supra, note 7
76. Seminar on Advocacy in the Supreme Court of Canada held in Saskatoon,
Canada, February 17, 1978.
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sentiments are unmistakable, for he urges the bar to "make its
presentation for oral argument on the principle that it always is of
the highest, and often of controlling importance." 
77
The explanation for this enthusiasm is apparent. A skilled
advocate will streamline a bulky record and place the issues in
perspective. 78 Oral argument obliges counsel to stake their ground
and summarize their position. 79 The verbosity which characterizes
the written presentation is stripped away.80 This aids the court's
understanding and as it expedites the entire process the bench will
listen. 81 The decision makers appreciate the opportunity to quiz
counsel as it enables them to highlight what divides the parties and
perhaps to view the case from an entirely new perspective.8 2 Judge
Loughran also believes that there is an intangible element present
with the oral argument: "The printed word of the ablest advocate, to
me at least, falls short of the same arguments when heard face to
face through his living voice." 8 3 Others relish the seminar
atmosphere and the excitement present when educated persons
struggle for answers to complex problems.
84
Advocates also can justify Mr. Freedman's claim that it is
"impossible to overestimate the importance of oral argument." ' 85
There is no better time to emphasize one's best arguments and
construct a framework that will support a possible favourable
decision. It is probably the single occasion counsel has the full
court's attention 86 and it is undoubtedly counsel's best opportunity
to discuss the case with the judges. This is because judicial
questions enable counsel "to see into the working of the mind of the
judge." '8 7 After an expert sits down the court knows exactly what
counsel's position is on all relevant points.
77. Supra, note 7
78. Weiner, supra, note 5 at 59; see Hiscock, supra, note 7 at 139
79. Gordon, supra, note 7 at 446
80. See Loughran, supra, note 7 at 6; Robinette, supra, note 7
81. Wilkins, supra, note 2 at 116
82. Gordon, supra, note 7 at 445-46; Kaufman, supra, note 7 at 171. It is Mr.
Robinette's view that "[t]he real merit of oral argument is that in the cross fire of
discussion the issues become crystallized and vivid." Supra, note 7. See also
Weiner, supra, note 5 at 59
83. Supra, note 7 at 6. Chief Judge Kaufman puts it this way: "An oral argument
is as different from a brief as a love song is from a novel." Supra, note 7 at 171
84. Id.; see also Hiscock, supra, note 7 at 139; Kaufman, supra, note 7 at 171
85. Supra, note 7 at 302
86. Rail, supra, note I at 118
87. Freedman, supra, note 7 at 308
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Unfortunately though, judicial participation does unnerve some
advocates,88 and those withering under a barrage of queries, might
if they have an inadequate understanding of the process, resent this
interruption of their carefully constructed arguments. 89 Counsel are
mistaken if judicial questions are considered evidence of unfriendly
orientation, 90 for judicial queries are invariably a plea for
enlightment. 9 A discerning advocate knows that an appellate court
is "not designed as a dozing audience for the reading of
soliloquies", 9 2 accepts his responsibility to help judges create law
and acknowledges that his major function is to answer questions. 93
For these reasons, capable advocates welcome the opportunity to
clarify matters the judges consider important but which are unclear
to them.9 4 Is it not fair to suggest that counsel whose preference it is
that judges keep their questions to themselves have little confidence
in their persuasive abilities?
95
A good advocate does not evade the court's questions. 96 If the
judge's timing is unfortunate, he answers the question quickly and
indicates a more complete answer will follow. 9 7 Of course,
88. Many questions are unpredictable and the unknown is disconcerting. There are
of course questions which must be asked and for these experienced counsel will
have prepared answers. But is it not the unexpected interrogatory which makes the
oral argument a thrilling experience? Davis, supra, note 3 at 858
89. Gordon, supra, note 7 at 450. Judge Hiscock sympathizes with this position
because it is his opinion that interruptions confuse inadequate advocates and
endanger the logical presentation of intelligent counsel who will in all likelihood
discuss the judge's point anyway, and better if left to his own devices. Supra, note
7 at 140
90. Jackson, supra, note 7 at 862; Wilkins, supra, note 2 at 121
91. Anderson, supra, note 7 at 703; Davis, supra, note 3 at 898; Freedman, supra,
note 7 at 307; Gordon, supra, note 7 at 450; Wilkins, supra, note 2 at 122
92. Frankfurter, supra, note 32
93. Rombauer, supra, note 7 at 182
94. Freedman, supra, note 7 at 308; Gordon, supra, note 7 at 450; Wilkins, supra,
note 2 at 122. An irrelevant question identifies for the advocate those who have
misunderstood the argument. If a major proposition is involved then remedial
measures are necessary. Anderson, supra, note 7 at 704
95. Rail, supra, note 1
96. O'Driscoll, supra, note 6 at 211; Rail, supra, note 1 at 129; Jackson, supra,
note 7 at 862; Wilkins, supra, note 2 at 122
97. See Rail, supra, note 1 at 129; Wilkins, supra, note 2 at 122. Mr. Freedman
urges a prompt complete answer because of the dramatic impact such produces.
Supra, note 7 at 308. Lord Macmillan endorses this approach as it meets a
legitimate need of the questioner. Supra, note 7 at 29. Mr. Medina sanctions
dilatory responses if a later point would be more propitious. Supra, note 3 at 143.
Mr. O'Driscoll, Q.C. thinks momentary delays are acceptable, otherwise counsel
should answer immediately. Supra, note 6 at 211. Chief Justice Wilkins did not
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questions of a rhetorical nature need no answer and if counsel is
unsure whether a comment demands a reply he will ask, "Is that a
question?" But woe unto the person who postpones answers with
the promise of a future response which never materializes. 9" Lord
Macmillan perjoratively describes such procrastinators as issuers of
"promissory notes" .99
As no position is impregnable counsel should expect damaging
questions.100 An honest answer and the admission certain hurdles
bar the way does not foreclose one from stressing the countervailing
considerations which offset the admitted deficiencies. 101 The court
appreciates frankness and Lord Macmillan believes that concessions
invoke the judges' aid. 102 He explains, "You will almost invariably
find that the first instinct of the judge is to assist you by pointing out
that the evidence is less damaging to you than you presented or that
the precedent is on examination distinguishable." 1
03
When an advocate is without an answer this should be
disclosed. 10 4 Provided that this is an infrequent response and the
tolerate evasiveness but agreed time should be granted if an immediate answer
"would require too long a digression." Supra, note 2 at 122
98. Wilkins, supra, note 2 at 122
99. Supra, note 7
100. Questions will relate both to the facts and the law.
101. See Freedman, supra, note 7 at 308
102. Macmillan, supra, note 7 at 24
103. Id. In a multipartite court judges will often entertain different views and
perhaps ask questions which will prompt answers satisfactorily meeting another
judge's objections. See Regina v. Cote (1974), 21 C.C.C. 2d 474 (Sask. C.A.) for
an example of judicial assistance.
104. Rombauer, supra, note 7 at 182; Freedman, supra, note 7 at 308. This is
precisely what the Attorney General of Texas did while arguing the respondent's
side in a capital punishment case, Jurek v. Texas (1976), 428 U.S. 262. The
following transcript is reproduced in 90 Landmark Briefs and Arguments of the
Supreme Court of the United States: Constitutional Law (1977) 617 at 647-49:
THE COURT: Before you leave that - this is not involved in the present case,
but you have brought it up. Is there a requirement under Texas Law that the
defendant must have known that the victim was a police officer?
MR. HILL: No, that he is in the course of duty and that I
THE COURT: Must he know that he is a police officer?
MR. HILL: I frankly don't know.
THE COURT: Or has that been decided perhaps?
MR. HILL: I frankly -
THE COURT: Most of the Texas cases, they were in uniform, as I remember.
MR. HILL: I beg your pardon?
THE COURT: Most of the Texas cases, they were in uniform. Am I right?
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question is not an obvious one counsel should have anticipated, the
incident will do little harm. '0 5 No one likes to acknowledge gaps in
their preparation, but the alternative of dissimulation is far more
dangerous. Ignorance is much easier to admit than to feign learning,
and the advocate foolish enough to attempt the latter will soon be
unmasked, with the consequence that the discovery will do far more
damage than an original concession.' 06 As well, the good lawyer
does not hesitate to reformulate a previous erroneous answer to
avoid the pitfalls associated with forced and illogical
justifications. 10 7 And if counsel entertains any doubts about a
question, the proper course is to seek a restatement, a request the
court will honor, if the matter is significant. 108
Should counsel's response prove inadequate nothing is gained by
giving the court time to reflect on the lawyer's deficiencies.10 9
Dawdling is not advisable here and besides, counsel's alacrity can
be checked if the court wishes to probe with further questions.
MR. HILL: Yes, sir, but I think what Justice Stewart may be asking, Mr.
Justice Marshall, is that someone is impersonating - or perhaps you just simply
THE COURT: A plain clothes officer.
MR. HILL: He is a plain clothes officer; you are not aware that he is in the
course of duty.
THE COURT: That's right. We dealt with that here in
MR. HILL: I will check it for you and -
THE COURT: Well, it is not relevant to this case, but I just -
MR. HILL: My impression is that knowing would be involved.
THE COURT: Mr. Attorney General, just to save you the trouble of looking -
I think I quote from your code - the person murdered was a peace officer or
fireman who was acting in the lawful discharge of an official duty and who the
defendant knew was a peace officer or fireman. The defendant knew -
MR. HILL: I appreciate that very much, Mr. Justice Blackmun. I have tried to
prepare very diligently for this matter, and I obviously didn't do a hundred
percent -
THE COURT: Well, I think it is an obvious answer. You don't have a Feola
problem.
105. Jackson,supra, note 7 at 862
106. Jackson, supra, note 7 at 862; Medina, supra, note 3 at 143
107. Rombauer, supra, note 7 at 182
108. This often gives counsel valuable time to prepare a response.
109. Nothing is gained by the agonizing period of silence which often follows poor
answers. A slight pause emphasizes brilliant responses, but that is not the effect one
seeks with dismal ones.
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In spite of the foregoing, there exists two types of questions
which counsel may politely decline to answer. No question should
be answered which necessarily draws on facts outside the record. 110
Nor should counsel deal with issues which are irrelevant, which
may happen if the judge interjects facts which are not on the
record. I I' Care must be taken with this last group for judges seldom
characterize their inquiries in this fashion. A persistent judge may
draw an answer but such should include the qualification that the
point is not in issue for the reasons given. 1 2 An experienced
counsel says escape is possible only if "the judge next to him will
nudge him to shut up and let you go on with your argument." "1
3
This is not an ironclad rule and occasionally counsel must be
prepared to discuss relevant hypothetical situations which will test
the validity of propositions in border areas. Barristers have no
reason to object to queries of this nature.
To summarize, if a judge considers a matter important enough to
warrant a question, counsel should, as a matter of respect answer
the question."14 Besides, the advocate who copes with incisive
questions will strike the court as a reliable and creditable
authority."15 Furthermore, the facts and the law may favor the
other side and the last thing a good advocate wants to do is
antagonize a judge by ignoring his queries."16 Counsel most
certainly should never reveal their distaste for judicial participation.
The lawyer who, after answering a question turned to the public
gallery and exclaimed, "Is there anyone else present who would
like to ask any questions?", is not a model to emulate." 7 Judicial
interogatories are not an invitation to counsel to abandon the rules of
common courtesy.
There is not a perfect correlation between a judge's impressions
at the conclusion of oral argument and the final disposition, but the
identity is strong enough to warrant the devotion of considerable
110. Denecke, supra, note 7 at 361; Gordon, supra, note 7 at 450; Wilkins, supra,
note 2 at 117. Even if counsel is aware of crucial facts these cannot be referred to
when the record is silent.
111. Gordon, supra, note 7 at 450; Jackson, supra, note 7 at 862; O'Driscoll,
supra, note 6 at 211
112. Rail, supra, note I at 130
113. Id. An advocate turns to the full court for protection whenever a partisan
judge's conduct jeopardizes a fair hearing. Freedman, supra, note 7 at 305
114. Medina, supra, note 3 at 143; Rail, supra, note 1 at 129
115. See Freedman, supra, note 7 at 308
116. Medina, supra, note 3 at 143
117. Wilkins, supra, note 2 at 121
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energies to the preparation of a convincing oral presentation. 118
Professor Weiner suspects that an advocate's performance may be
crucial in up to 50 percent of the cases. 119
IV. Preparation
Given the importance of oral argument, adequate preparation is
indispensable. 12 0 Disorganized, counsel will be ineffective and put
in full retreat by a challenging court. One side has to lose but the
explanation should never be counsel's unpreparedness. This
admonition is well taken: "And let the work be done, not for the
mere gain, but as the artist works, for the satisfaction of making
each piece of work as consummate a piece of craftsmanship as you
can. ''121 There is more than personal satisfaction at stake, for the
lawyer does owe a duty to the state and court, and plays a crucial
role in the legal process. 
1 22
A successful advocate does everything that will free the mind of
all distractions 123 so that there is nothing to concentrate on but the
merits of the case. This is why care has to be taken beforehand to
clarify roles if counsel does not act alone. 124 An interrupting
associate persistently offering advice is counter-productive, shatter-
ing the advocate's train of thought and probably the court's too.125
Associates can be valuable but their contribution is usually
restricted to the location of some document in the record and the
comfort of another mind during recesses when the proceedings can
118. Currie, supra, note 7 at 562; Jackson, supra, note 7. Professor Weiner's
study sets the figure anywhere between 60 and 97 per cent. Supra, note 5 at 58 n.7
119. Advocacy makes the most difference in those cases "where no one would
suppose 'that civilization will come to an end whichever way this case is
decided'." Weiner, supra, note 5 at 58
120. Kaufman, supra, note 7 at 172; O'Driscoll, supra, note 6 at 206
121. Hilbery, Duty and Art in Advocacy (1946) in O'Driscoll, supra, note 6 at 206
122. See Canadian Bar Association, supra, note 16
123. Jackson, supra, note 7 at 861. If an advocate's brown shoes bother him, and
he is annoyed because he did not pack his black pair, he will purchase black ones.
If his scuffed black shoes bother him they will be polished.
124. As a general rule lawyers avoid any division of presentation responsibilities,
for judges do not respect such assignments as they tend to rob the proceedings of
desirable flexibility. Mr. Justice Jackson would like a rule limiting one counsel to a
side. Id. at 802. Rule 37 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada state that
"no more than two counsel for each party shall be heard on any appeal." Mr. Rail,
an experienced advocate, claims that the number of errors counsel makes rises
exponentially when more than one argues a case. Supra, note 1 at 119
125. Jackson, supra, note 7 at 861; O'Driscoll, supra, note 6 at 208
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be reviewed. 126
As the unknown can be disturbing, thinking novices who have
never appeared in the court about to hear their case take time to
observe its operations. 127 These preliminary observations will settle
any unarticulated doubts about general procedure and protocol and
save vital nervous energy.1 28 Other advocates can be studied and
their individual skills noted for future use. For example, an observer
might discover that a timely pause silences a court trading
comments amongst themselves,129 or that counsel argues minor
points during this period. 1
30
Preliminary investigations may reveal useful information about a
judge. 131 It is true that reported opinions will be the primary source
of helpful material, but other aids should not be neglected.1 32 For
example, in Harelkin v. University of Regina, 133 a due process case
involving internal university procedures, counsel, aware of the
extensive ties some members of the Court had with the academic
community might decide to devote less time to an explanation of
university procedures with which insiders would be conversant.
Other information could save counsel from embarrassment. Mr.
Freedman explains: "It is plain negligence for a lawyer to say in a
case involving a will contest that the testator was of unsound mind
126. There is value in having someone comment on proposed courses of
arguments.
127. Jackson,supra, note 7at 861
128. The tyro might wonder if the presiding judge introduces counsel, or will it be
the appellant's task? Is opposing counsel referred to as ".my friend" or "my
learned friend"? Mr. S. T. Bigelow, Q.C. indicates the latter is correct. Supra,
note 7 at 33. These are admittedly easy matters to master but until this is done,
doubts about them can absorb a disproportionate amount of energy. The foregoing
applies to novices but even the veteran must check the correct pronunciation of
words, the proper titles of judges in cases infrequently cited, and the names of the
judges hearing his case. The polished advocate will not want to worry about these
soluble problems.
129. Weiner, supra, note 5 at 63. But others find this form of rebuke offensive and
suggest that counsel continue the discussion with those listening. Medina, supra,
note 3 at 184. This is not the prevalent view though. Mr. O'Driscoll, Q.C. supports
Professor Weiner's tactics. Supra, note 6 at 212
130. See S. T. Bigelow, supra, note 7 at 72; Rall, supra, note I at 126
131. Judges are ordinary persons with life experiences they will bring to their
judicial work.
132. Lord Macmillan consulted the "Who's Who". Supra, note 7 at 23.
Periodicals sometimes contain articles on prominent active judges. For example,
Professor Gibson has written about Mr. Justice Dickson. Unobtrusive Justice
(1974), 12 Osgoode Hall L.J. 339
133. (S.C.C. March 30, 1979) (unreported)
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because of his age, when one or more of the justices listening to his
argument have already passed that age."' 1
34
An outstanding lawyer is always well prepared, not only because
oral argument is important, but because victory is never certain.
Litigants seldom carry disputes to higher courts without considera-
ble support for their cause - thus the need for eternal vigilance. 
135
It matters not that the respondent was triumphant in the lower courts
if the court of last resort is unsympathetic. 136 If the propositions that
oral presentation is important and that triumph is never assured are
accepted, then counsel without the time to prepare adequately
should recognize the impropriety of their appearance. If hortatory is
all a participant has to offer, such a person is a liability regardless of
his standing.
Deficiences which are apparent when one stands behind the
podium were probably there when time for remedial measures
existed. An advocate must be familiar with every case cited in the
factum for its very presence therein identifies it as a valuable
decisional aid. 137 This does not mean counsel can ignore relevant
cases just because the factum makes no reference to them. The court
may well seek counsel's comments on how related areas of the law
should affect the case at bar. 138 Besides, what appears as an
important matter to a judge, might not strike counsel as such.
Should this happen and the judges pose unexpected questions, only
the advocate who is thoroughly schooled in his case will escape
unscathed. Preparation introduces the dimension of flexibility
which is essential in a socratic setting. Accordingly, superb counsel
master not only the legal principles that directly govern the problem
but related general principles as well. ' 3 9 An advocate who is equal
to this task gains the court's trust as a reliable source of information.
The converse is also true - a judge who finds counsel's responses
inadequate will wonder if deficiencies exist elsewhere as well. 1
40
134. Supra, note 7 at 305. Lord Macmillan counsels that "lilt is unwise to attack
too violently the practices of landowners when that invaluable manual [Who's
Who] has informed you that a member of the Committee owns 30,000 acres
.... "Supra, note 5 at 24
135. Denecke, supra, note 7 at 361
136. For example, in Canadian Indus. Gas & Oil Ltd. v. Saskatchewan (1977), 18
N.R. 107 the Supreme Court of Canada reversed the decision of the Saskatchewan
Court of Appeal and the trial court which declared the impugned legislation valid.
137. This covers both the facts and the law.
138. Jackson, supra, note 7 at 861
139. Freedman, supra, note 7 at 306; Jackson, supra, note 7 at 861
140. Weiner, supra, note 5 at 11
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Because judges draw these inferences lawyers follow simple
precautions to eliminate any bases for untoward impressions.
1 4 1
Careful proofreading of the factum will catch spelling errors and
incorrect citations. If the factum is free of avoidable errors then
counsel will not labor under initial handicaps, but, as Chief Justice
Wilkins observes, "[A]ny considerable number [of errors] tends to
destroy confidence in the substance of the brief itself .... ,142
and counsel as well. '
43
Obviously then, the factum a conscientious lawyer submits to the
court is not a first draft, because it will be needlessly verbose,
suspect in its organization, replete with inaccurate statements of the
law either because of their generality or particularity, and imprecise
in its expression of principle. 144 For the same reasons an appellate
court should not hear an oral presentation unexposed to thorough
revision. 145
Careful attention to the oral presentation does not have as the goal
memorization 1 46 of any material. 147 Instead, it is hoped that the
familiarization process will prompt at a timely juncture questions
and doubts which can be resolved. 148 Sometimes vocalization
creates a sensitivity to issues absent with sight alone.' 49 Practice
makes it easier to anticipate judicial queries, which of course
enables counsel to deliver planned responses. Vocalization
emphasizes the presence of clumsy expressions1 50 and identifies
those words the pronunciation of which counsel is unsure, or for
141. Currie, supra, note 7 at 561
142. Supra, note 2 at 119
143. Currie, supra, note 7 at 561
144. Denecke, supra, note 7 at 356
145. Jackson, supra, note 7 at 861; Weiner, supra, note 5 at 72. At the very least,
Mr. Rail maintains, advocates should test their statement of facts. Supra, note I at
123
146. To overcome initial nervousness some counsel memorize their openings.
Rail, supra, note 1 at 123. Nervousness tends to disappear with the commencement
of the argument.
147. Gordon, supra, note 7 at 452; Medina, supra, note 3 at 140. I have seen
counsel argue before the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Chicago without
notes but the presentation was invariably short and clearly not a recitation.
148. If counsel objectively evaluates the best aspects of both sides, potential
judicial questions can be discovered and answered in the mind, well in advance of
the oral presentation. Freedman, supra, note 7 at 300-301
149. This is certainly my experience as a law school instructor, one confirmed by
several of my colleagues.
150. For example, Mr. O'Driscoll, Q.C. suggests that "I submit" is preferable to,
"I put it to you". Supra, note 6 at 212. For a list of words and phrases to avoid see
Cooper, supra, note 7 at 28-36
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emotive reasons, are inappropriate, given the nature of the case.
The removal of these rough edges fills counsel with confidence and
impresses the court.
Mr. Justice Jackson urges advocates to "use every available anvil
on which to hammer out your argument."151 A discerning listener
can help weed out unconscious speech patterns, such as the
excessive use of "you know", "I mean", "okay", identify
malapropisms, 152 and detect arguments, which are cogent only to a
partisan, but would not survive objective scrutiny. 153 The complete
counsel solicits the frank opinions of associates for an impartial
impression points out not only arguments which must be eliminated
as irrelevant, 154 but which need reinforcement. 155 In other words, a
probing third party mind can reveal suspect areas in need of
attention, with a powerful compact argument the result.
The good advocate appreciates what is at issue and presents to the
court in a precise manner the merits of the side. Judges welcome
such artists for they face a regular barrage of irrelevancies which
jeopardize their concentration powers. And judges who labor long
hours will not tolerate with good humor those who waste the court's
time.156 Lord Ellenborough, having endured a boring oration, in
response to counsel's request as to when it would be the court's
pleasure to hear the remainder of his argument said, "We are bound
to hear you, and we will endeavor to give you our undivided
attention on Friday next, but as for pleasure, that, sir, has been long
151. Supra, note 7 at 861. Mr. Maloney, Q.C. reports that senior accomplished
barristers are not as a rule reluctant to share their thoughts with their more junior
colleagues. Supra, note 6. Of course, the comments of any intelligent listener
should be invited if the occasion presents itself.
152. A lawyer who argued in front of Mr. Justice Gordon of the Wisconsin
Supreme Court referred to a decision as an "exhausting opinion". Gordon, supra,
note 7 at 451
153. The moment a lawyer accepts a client's cause his objectivity diminishes. This
is unavoidable but if counsel is aware of this phenomenon, realizes there is
probably merit on both sides, the "perils of overtenacity" can be avoided.
Freedman, supra, note 7 at 300
154. One of the "perils of overtenacity" is the loss of any ability to determine
relevance.
155. Denecke, supra, note 7 at 358
156. Many judges devote their lives to their work. Mr. Justice Jackson reports that
"Justices Brandeis and Cardozo were almost as retired as hermits and [that] Chief
Justice Hughes withdrew from all social engagements .... "Supra, note 7 at 863.
Chief Justice Duff's private secretary records the dedication of Sir Lyman. It was
not unusual for the Chief Justice to work evenings and Sundays. Campbell, supra,
note 39 at 249. That diligent judges are able to display any patience at all under
trying circumstances the writer has witnessed, is most amazing.
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out of question."v 5 7 Therefore, there is great merit in a screening
process which produces a precise presentation,' 58 and preserves
judicial patience. 1
59
Preparation is crucial, for the advocate stands alone behind the
podium, dependent on his own resources to effectively forward the
client's position and answer the court's questions. Admittedly, a
lawyer can map the course of the argument but the nature and extent
of the court's interest is not always predictable and major
alterations, which this interest may prompt, will undo all but the
masters of the art. 160 An advocate does not have the luxury of
contemplation once the proceedings commence yet a skilled
performer will survive because of a quick mind and perfect
knowledge of the fact pattern and the law. It is true, as Mr.
Freedman maintains, that -[t]he distinguishing hallmark of the
advocate is the capacity to improvise and above all else to act
spontaneusly and intuitively in the heat of the battle"' 6 ' but what
Mr. Nizer says of trial work is equally applicable to appellate
endeavors: "[P]roper preparation is the be all and end all of trial
success." 162 Without prior study, even the most able lawyer, will
not be in a position to derive maximum advantage from an oral
presentation.
Accomplished speakers do not ignore any system which enhances
their delivery, and Lord Macmillan specifically urges counsel not to
''neglect the mechanical side of preparation.' 163 A judge thinks
little of an advocate engaged in a frenetic search of the record16 4 and
157. L.J. Bigelow, supra, note 40 at 64
158. Mr. Freedman writes, "The more inexperienced the advocate, the longer will
be his argument." Supra, note 7 at 309. Judge Anderson tells the story of the great
evangelist who required a month's notice if his presentation was not to exceed
twenty minutes, two weeks if the time was an hour but no notice if given unlimited
time. Supra, note 7 at 701
159. Mr. Justice Wightman must have been a patient man. After counsel had
repeated himself a number of times his Lordship sighed, -'You've said that
before." To counsel's reply "Have I, my lord? I'm very sorry. I quite forgot it.",
Mr. Justice Wightman bravely responded, "Don't apologize. I forgive you, for it
was a very long time ago." S. Jackson, supra, note 40 at 20
160. To cover contingencies counsel prepares alternative "game plans" which are
employed as the court's reaction is recorded. If opposition registers then the
detailed argument is adopted and the outline form is abandoned. The latter is
employed when judicial approval is met. See Weiner, supra, note 4 at 75
161. Supra, note 7 at 298. A lawyer whose preparation is deficient will not be in a
position to improvise. Kaufman, supra, note 7 at 172
162. L. Nizer, My Life in Court (New York: Pyramid Books, 1963) at 10
163. Macmillan, supra, note 7 at 25
164. Davis, supra, note 3 at 893; Loughran, supra, note 7 at 5; Macmillan, supra,
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counsel's embarrassment may deleteriously affect the remainder of
his presentation. 1
65
The sole measure of any aid is its utility and a number which
follow have demonstrated their efficacy: (1) Lawyers have found
that a tab system promotes mastery of the record, 166 however
voluminous it may be. 167 These markers highlight the most
important aspects, 168 and a short index typed on an accessible card
covers the less significant. Any fact counsel plans to refer to is
keyed to the record, lest the reference arouse the court's curiousity.
This artifice, of course, makes possible an automatic satisfactory
answer. 169 A polished advocate does not waste the court's time
wading through the record, with the attendant risk that his and the
court's concentration, probably for good, will be lost. 170 (2) A
sophisticated card system can assist counsel's retrieval of legal
information. 171 All case briefs are recorded on single cards and,
overlapping, with just the case name at the bottom showing,
attached at the top edge to counsel's case file. Arranged properly a
relevant case can be immediately spotted and the salient features
taken in with a momentary glance.1 72 Imaginative use of ink color
codes will also add other dimensions to this system. 173 (3) An
outline page on which the entire argument appears in headline form
is also valuable. This serves as a ready reference sheet and gives
counsel the flexibility needed in oral argument. 174 (4) Counsel who
read from the reports carefully tab the appropriate pages and clearly
delineate the quoted passage. Failure to observe these elementary
note 5 at 26
165. See Rail, supra, note I at 123
166. Chief Justice Wilkins exhorts counsel to "'Know the record!" Supra, note 2
at 116. Mr. Nizer could recite the record from memory but this is not what Chief
Justice Wilkins had in mind. L. Nizer, supra, note 162. Professor Weiner
maintains that lawyers who deny the necessity of mastering the record suffer from a
hardening of the forensic arteries. Supra, note 5 at 69
167. Weiner, supra, note 5 at 70-71
168. A paper clip attached to a few important pages may prove useful.
169. Rail, supra, note I at 123. Counsel must have instant answers to questions
involving the record. O'Driscoll, supra, note 6 at 213
170. Macmillan, supra, note 7 at 25
171. An advocate will be familiar with all the cases but this aid certainly increases
one's security, and hence, confidence in one's ability.
172. This certainly is preferable to a comprehensive written statement which
obliges the advocate to fix his attention on the statement rather than the court being
addressed.
173. For example, all cases which support theory -X- might appear in red type.
174. Rail,supra, note I at 122-23
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precautions force counsel to skim the page for what inevitably
becomes an elusive passage. This frantic search can be eliminated if
care is taken to highlight the borders of the quotation. 
175
V. Manner of Presentation
The concepts counsel argues are of fundamental importance, but not
to be overlooked is the mode of presentation. Mr. Levitan explains
it this way: "An unshaven, dirty-collared, baggy-suited salesman
handicaps himself in selling, no matter how superior the
merchandise.' 176 Obviously, how something is said does not
change the content, but what the delivery does affect is the reception
accorded the message, which is crucial in a court setting. A bad idea
remains just that regardless of the technique used to explain it, but a
good concept can be overlooked if it is not advanced correctly. The
haberdashers make the same point when they maintain that a stylish
suit will not put a buffoon into the boardroom, but that a poor
appearance might keep a good prospect out.
An advocate will avoid conduct which diverts attention from his
arguments, especially if it is objectionable. For this reasbn
customary attire is advisable. 177 A catalogue of disruptive conduct
would also mention peripatetic advocates, of which it has been said,
"nothing but distraction is the result of watching the gymnastic
exploits of any advocate, ' ' 178 and other personal idiosyncracies
such as pencil tapping, paper shuffling and change jingling. 17
9
These problems are overcome though by the advocate who stands
erect, resting his hands either by his side or on the podium. 180 What
is decried are movements which are incongruous with the speaker's
topic. On the other hand, there is much to be said for the person who
can effectively punctuate his speech with the appropriate gestures;
175. Use a paper clip to find the page and a pencil mark in the margin and brackets
to isolate the quotation. This works much better than the human memory.
176. Supra, note 7 at 61
177. Mr. O'Driscoll, Q.C. describes proper apparel for the male advocate in his
article on appellate advocacy. Supra, note 6 at 207. The writer forwards no opinion
on the desirability of this habit.
178. Freedman, supra, note 7 at 303
179. How annoying this last pastime can be is illustrated by this tale. The judge,
exasperated by counsel's incessant coin jingling, asked counsel how much change
he had. To the reply of four quarters and a dime, the judge announced his citation
of counsel for contempt of court with an accompanying one dollar fine, and
concluded with this, "Now let us hear you rattle that damn dime, counsellor."
180. Rombauer, supra, note 7 at 182. Counsel must also be vigilant while seated
for excessive note taking distracts some judges. Medina, supra, note 3 at 140
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the adept may express his bewilderment with a certain decision by
scratching his head or raising his eyebrows.
Considerate lawyers speak loud enough to be comfortably
heard. 18' If the advocate is inaudible, which happens when the
volume is no more than a whisper, the intention being the attraction
of the bench's attention, the value of even a brilliant argument is
minimal.18 2 A good advocate will not strain his listener's auditory
powers. 183 Equally objectionable is the lawyer who attempts to
carry the day by the mere din of his voice. 184 Mr. Freedman warns
that such a speaker will "close the ears of the court to what he
says"' 185 and Mr. Justice Jackson adds that "no judge likes to be
shouted at as if he were an ox." ' 18 6 Excesses of this nature are
concrete burdens, as is anything which detracts from the speaker's
theme. 1
87
The size of appellate courts vary somewhat with the result that the
volume necessary to make oneself heard in an intimate courtroom
will not be the same as that needed in a cavernous chamber. '88
Counsel will fare well if they abide by the fundamentals of good
public speaking. 189 Accomplished lawyers do not speak in a
monotone, but like all good speakers, vary the emphasis to highlight
important passages. 1 90 This immediately signals the court some-
thing significant will be discussed. If this promise is not realized the
court will subsequently ignore such signs, and counsel will lose a
181. Other suggestions: Mr. Medina advises one to "speak in a clear and distinct
voice with as little harshness or discordancy as possible" and Mr. O'Driscoll
favors "a loud clear voice". Supra, note 3 at 140 and, supra, note 6 at 211,
respectively
182. Medina, supra, note 3 at 139; Rail, supra, note 1 at 131
183. Davis, supra, note 3 at 896; Medina, supra, note 3
184. Medina, supra, note 3
185. Supra, note 7 at 303
186. Supra, note 7 at 861
187. Objectionable speech habits impair the advocates' delivery and should be
eliminated. A judge irritated by a profusion of "you know", "aah", "like", "I
mean", will not appreciate any argument replete with these vexatious interjections.
188. The main courtroom of the Supreme Court of Canada is spacious and no
doubt, partially in recognition of this fact, the Court now asks all advocates,
whether Her Majesty's Counsel or not, to speak from the inner bar. Mr. Justice
Jackson described the acoustical properties of the American Supreme Court
chamber as "wretched" and suggested counsel adjust to the perceived signals from
the bench. Supra, note 7 at 861
189. Weiner, supra, note 5 at 60
190. Medina, supra, note 3 at 140; Weiner, supra, note 5 at 61; Wilkins, supra,
note 2 at 119-20
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valuable aid. 191 This is why Professor Weiner condemns the
"ministerial cadence", which describes a regular pattern of
emphasis with no apparent purpose.1 92 Of course, the precepts of
public speaking rule out mumbling 193 and Mr. O'Driscoll, Q.C.
suggests that counsel "should speak slowly, but should not drag out
his words." 1
94
A judge's ajudicative task is difficult enough as it is and they
prefer not to suffer advocates with objectionable speech habits or
voices which are either inaudible or thunderous.1 95 Nor does the
boring advocate who reads his oral argument have any place in an
appellate forum. Mr. Justice Jackson asserts that "if you have
confidence to address the court only by reading to it, you should
really not argue then."196 Besides, a reader forfeits the valuable
opportunities offered by the spontaneous give-and-take with the
bench.
Experts enthusiastically condemn readers 197 and some courts do
not stop at expressing their "disfavor" of the practice of reading. ' 98
The Wisconsin Supreme Court rules specifically prohibited the
reading of written argument. 199 This distaste is deeply rooted as the
following epithet used to describe a reader attests: "A brief reader is
the lowest form of living animal." ' 200 Readers are dismissed
because they are boring201 and this conduct "places a needless
barrier between a lawyer and his judicial audience." ' 20 2 There are
other compelling reasons why a capable advocate does not read his
factum or prepared material. First, a judge can read the factum
himself. 20 3 An appellate judge acidly complained, "We may not be
191. Such practioners are like the little shepherd who yelled "wolf" too often.
192. Weiner, supra, note 5 at 62
193. Id.
194. Supra, note 6 at 211
195. Davis, supra, note 3
196. Supra, note 7 at 861
197. Rombauer, supra, note 7 at 180; Davis, supra, note 3 at 896; Gordon, supra,
note 7 at 448; Jackson, supra, note 7 at 861; O'Driscoll, supra, note 6 at 211;
Weiner, supra, note 5 at 60; Wilkins, supra, note 2 at 122
198. Rule 44(1) of the Revised Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States
provides: "Oral argument should be undertaken to emphasize and clarify the
written argument appearing in the briefs theretofore filed. The court looks with
disfavor on any oral argument that is read from a prepared text."
199. Wis. Stat. Ann. 751.59 (West 1978) repealed as of August 1, 1978
200. Wilkins, supra, note 2 at 122
201. Rail, supra, note 1 at 127
202. Gordon, supra, note 7 at 448; see Davis, supra, note 3 at 898
203. Rail,supra, note I at 121
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able to think but we can certainly read. ' 20 4 Second, the frequent
interruptions of judges make the prepared text unsuitable for this
form of dialogue. Third, the existence of written argument tempts
counsel to adhere to it, a slavishness which is unwarranted given the
function of the appellate hearing. Statutes or crucial written
instruments such as indictments or contracts will be read, but other
material only of necessity.2 0 5 Fourth, excessive attention to a
written draft might cause an advocate to miss a telling judicial
reaction. 20 6 As well, some judges "like to meet the eye of the
advocate", as this reinforces the co-operative nature of the
venture.2 0 7 In short, the appellate hearing is not designed as an
occasion for counsel lectures.
20 8
A good delivery enhances any argument and counsel would be
remiss not to cultivate the good habits mentioned above. If a
practice session with a keen and sympathetic listener improves the
substance of the presentation, might it not also have similar benefits
for the manner of the presentation?
VI. The Oral Presentation
Both sides will reap the rewards preparatory work provides but it is
the appellant who has the first opportunity to use his erudition on his
client's behalf. The appellant has the carriage of the case and the
heavy responsibility of relating the fact pattern in an understandable
and interesting format.2 0 9 Little is gained from a confused
presentation yet the advantages of an artful effort are manifold. The
interesting one stimulates the court, the dull one enervates it. As
well, the court holds in high esteem counsel who open skilfully. The
drawbacks of a poor portrayal are manifest. An inferior effort so
confounds the court that the law can only be argued after judicial
204. Gordon, supra, note 7 at 448
205. Davis, supra, note 3 at 898; Rail, supra, note 1 at 126. Give the judge a
reference to the record when anything therein is read, for the eye complements the
ear. Davis, supra, note 3 at 898; Jackson, supra, note 7 at 804; Rail, supra, note 1
at 126. Never read pages of case opinions. The Wisconsin Supreme Court Rules
stated, "Decisions relied upon may be stated in substance but not read." Supra,
note 199. If something must be read "read to the court and not to the book or paper
from which you are quoting." Rombauer, supra, note 7 at 182
206. Rombauer, supra, note 7 at 182
207. Jackson, supra, note 7 at 861
208. Weiner, supra, note 5 at 73; see also S. T. Bigelow, supra, note 7 at 30. Mr.
Justice Frankfurter likened the hearing to a "socratic dialogue." Kaufman, supra,
note 7 at 170
209. Medina, supra, note 3 at 140
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intervention elicits the relevant facts and their chronology. 210 To
ensure an attentive court, prominent attorneys frame this question:
"What would you like to hear about this case if you were the
judge?" 211 In other words, they ask what decisional aids the court
needs and then govern their conduct accordingly. The "implements
of decision" as Mr. Justice Homes described decisional aids
212
cover both facts and the law.
213
The employment of this test should resolve many doubts
advocates have about their presentation. It suggests that the
introduction of the participants be the first matter attended to after
the appeal is called, for in any discussion this is the polite and
sensible arrangement. Because the appellant speaks first that side
should identify counsel if the court does not take the initiative.
214
Some writers would not have the appellant introduce opposing
counsel, with the expectation the court would accord the respondent
the same courtesy, 215 but this cannot be the subject of hard and fast
rules, and will depend on the practice of each court. However, these
problems do not arise in the ultimate American, Canadian or
Ontario courts as the presiding judge invariably undertakes this
responsibility. 216
With introductions completed counsel can concentrate on the
effective communication of the appellant's case. But legal
arguments must have some factual framework for the courts rarely
210. Inadequate counsel work explains the need for some judicial questions. See
Anderson, supra, note 7 at 704. Mr. S. Jackson relates this admonition delivered
by Mr. Justice Maule to a befuddled lawyer: "Mr. Barker, cannot you state your
facts in some kind of order? Chronological is best but, if you can't manage that, try
some order. Why not alphabetical?" Supra, note 40 at 38. Lord Macmillan relates
the same tale in his article. Supra, note 7 at 23
211. Davis, supra, note 3 at 896; Medina, supra, note 3 at 140; Rail, supra, note 1
at 124. Lord Macmillan puts a slightly different question: If you were the judge,
how would you frame a judgment in your client's favor? Supra, note 7 at 23
212. Davis, supra, note 3 at 896
213. Medina, supra, note 3 at 140
214. Gordon, supra, note 7 at 447. The introduction may take this form: "May it
please your lordships [the Court], I am A.B., counsel for the appellant. Associated
with me is my learned friend C.D. My learned friend, E.F., is counsel for the
respondent." See S. T. Bigelow, supra, note 7 at 33; Rombauer, supra, note 7 at'
181; O'Driscoll, supra, note 6 at 209
215. Rombauer, supra, note 7 at 181
216. O'Driscoll, supra, note 6 at 209. Chief Justice Burger generally announces
the parties in the upcoming case and invites the appellant's counsel by name to
proceed whenever ready. When one speaker concludes his argument the court
introduces the next by name as well.
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decide abstract legal issues. 21 7 Thus, care must be taken to prepare
a receptive judicial mind which means the listener has to have
enough preliminary information to determine and appreciate from
the outset what is significant and relevant. 2 18 This function the
appellant commences by telling the court at the outset what area of
law the appeal touches. 219 Is it a defamation case, or a due process
controversy? Then indicate the case history, outlining briefly the
trial disposition and the appellate determination, if any. 2 20 Some
courts like to know whose work is under review and this
information can be provided at this stage.
2 2 1
Mr. Davis would then state the facts but, with respect, to do so
would be premature. 222 The impact of the statement can be
heightened if counsel explains the crucial issue before the court, as
this introduces another relevance indicator. 2 23 Counsel who fail to
identify the issues before tackling the facts risk judicial confusion, a
problem apparent from Mr. Justice Currie's observation that "it is
particularly annoying to a judge to have to listen to a long detailed
statement of facts in complete ignorance of their significance until
consel, at his convenience, is ready to let the court in on the secret
of what issues are being raised on appeal." ' 2 24 Only occasionally
would a statement of the facts allow the court to correctly guess the
reason for the inquiry. As well, deviation from this order does not
release counsel from any obligation to pose the questions presented
217. Reference cases are the exceptions and many participants object to the
abstract nature of these inquiries. See J. Lyon & R. Atkey, Canadian
Constitutional Law in a Modern Perspective (Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press,
1970) at 347-56
218. Accordingly, counsel must regulate the flow of information keeping in mind
that the court's familiarity with the case will not match his own. And even after the
preliminary groundwork has been laid, one must not concede the court too much
knowledge about the case. Rail, supra, note I at 124
219. Anderson, supra, note 7 at 702-3; Davis, supra, note 3 at 896; O'Driscoll,
supra, note 6 at 209; Rail, supra, note 1 at 124; Wilkins, supra, note 2 at 120
220. Currie, supra, note 7 at 562-63; Rail, supra, note I at 124
221. Mr. Davis opines that "judges, like humbler men, judge each other as well as
the law." Supra, note 3 at 896. See the text associated with note 58 for the opening
naming Mr. Justice Kekewich as the decision maker.
222. Supra, note 3 at 896
223. Weiner, supra, note 5 at 60
224. Currie, supra, note 7 at 563. Judge Anderson voices his displeasure this way:
"[When counsel initially attempts something other than an outline of the questions
to be argued] the court is very much in the position that an audience attending a
joint debate would be in, if the discussion got under way without a statement of the
subject being debated." Supra, note 5 at 702
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in "succinct and specific terms", 22 5 it simply delays the inevitable
and forces judges to interrupt and pry the information from
intractable lawyers. 226 a A sound opening will contain an initial
statement of the questions presented by the appeal, but it may omit
some of the other preliminary information, such as the case history
and still retain its utility. Or, as some counsel prefer, the issues
might precede other introductory material.
22 6b
A good statement of the questions presented has its rewards, a
fact illustrated by Mr. Justice Frankfurther's testimonial that Chief
Justice White merely had to state the question to disclose the
answer. 22 7 An opening which is free of confusing and irrelevant
details and complex sentences no listener could understand, that
incorporates prominent facts, gives the court some preliminary
flavor, presents the appellant in his best light without violating the
rules against bias, and fixes the court's attention, is effective. 228
The appellant enjoys a benefit that the respondent does not, for
the former, unlike the latter, has the luxury of time in the
formulation of the opening. On the bottomside counsel has to gauge
the court's mood, evaluate the appellant's thrust, and in a
comparatively short time digest all this and produce an attractive
response. But, this flexibility can be a potent force in the hands of
the adept. Obviously, the respondent's opening need not be
extemporaneous if counsel has accurately anticipated the appellant's
case and the court's response thereto.
225. Cooper, supra, note 7 at 68
226a. The following transcript reproduced in 83 Landmark Briefs and arguments
of the Supreme Court of the United States: Constitutional Law 285, 287 (1977)
contains the argument of the appellant in Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages (1976), 423
U.S. 276:
MR. MAY: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court:
This is a case which involves the import clause of the Federal Constitution and
the proper interpretation and application of that clause to imported tires and
tubes. The sole issue is whether tires imported without packaging and held for
the sale by the importer in his warehouse in the original form in which imported
are immune from local ad valorem taxes by reason of the import clause.
The trial court upheld the importer's claim of immunity with respect to both
tires and tubes. The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed with respect to the
tubes but reversed with respect to the tires, notwithstanding the fact that both the
tires and the tubes are handled precisely in the same manner while in the
importer's warehouse.
226b. Currie, supra, note 7 at 563; O'Driscoll, supra, note 6 at 210
227. Cooper, supra, note 7 at 77
228. Id. at 81-103; Weiner, supra, note 5 at 63-67. For examples of effective
openings see Anderson, 6supra, note 7 at 702 and Weiner, supra, note 5 at 63-65.
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After the questions presented have been addressed, those who
excel set aside time for a lucid exposition of the facts, which are
The following meets the standards outlined in the text: "This case . . . involves the
question of whether leaking water pipes can cause a constructive eviction; the case
also involves the issue of whether a landlord's recovery against his tenant who
vacates during the pendency of a valid lease should be reduced by the landlord's
failure to mitigate damages. Otherwise stated, appellant seeks to establish that
dripping water pipes, which irritate a commercial tenant's customers, interfere with
the operation of the tenant's store and perhaps cause a loss of business, are a
substantial interference with the tenant's enjoyment of the premises which can
terminate a lease. If the court finds that there has been no constructive eviction,
then appellant wishes that his landlord's recovery for unpaid rent should take into
account the failure to get a new tenant for the remainder of the term." The next
example deserves no accolades for its distinctive feature is total confusion. At issue
in Runyon v. McCrary (1976), 427 U.S. 160 was the lawfulness of private
discrimination. The following transcript is reproduced in 83 Landmark Briefs and
Arguments of the Supreme Court of the United States: Constitutional Law (1977)
859 at 861-62:
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BERGER: We will next hear argument in No. 75-62,
Runyon v. McCrary; No. 75-66, Fairfax-Brewster School v. Gonzales; No.
75-278, Southern Independent School Association v. McCrary; and No.
75-306, McCrary v. Runyon.
Mr. Koutoulakos, you may proceed whenever you are ready.
MR. KOUTOULAKOS: Mr. Chief Justice, Honorable Justices:
I represent the Bobbe's School, which is Mr. and Mrs. Runyon, who are
operating it; and I will limit my argument to the narrow areas of what I consider
the crucial issue in this case and, if necessary, will rebut on the point of the
statute of limitations on the right of attorneys' fees.
Now, first let me touch on the facts a little bit as to the reason why we are here.
The Bobbe's School is a small school in Arlington, Virginia - in Fairfax,
Virginia; it is right on the line - that operates a private school. It has been
stipulated in the facts that the school is not supported in any way by any Federal
or state money and it depends entirely in its support upon the student
enrollment.
Insofar as the Bobbe's School is concerned - now, this case was consolidated
with the Brewster School - but insofar as the Bobbe's School is concerned,
Mr. and Mrs. McCrary and Mr. and Mrs. Gonzales testified - and, of course,
this is unrebutted - that, as a result of a telephone call - this is, by both
parties, one in '69 and one in '71 or '72, as I recall - and no further contact and
no formal application - as a result of a telephone call, it brought into play
Section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act that we are now here under. And the court,
upon hearing evidence - and there is a serious question in my mind as to
whether or not - and the dissent was in agreement with what I am going to say:
that there is a serious question of whether or not they made out a case. They
certainly did not rebut the fact that there are selective standards of exclusion by
our school. There is no evidence contrary to that. I think all the evidence is clear
that no one would be admitted on the basis of a phone call. There has to be a
formal application and certain admission policies that are necessary, such as a
medical examination, a personal interview with a parent, and, based on that,
then it is determined as to whether or not the person is to be admitted. Now, it
616 The Dalhousie Law Journal
developed just like a story-teller would. 2 29 This is part of a building
block process which enables counsel to eventually meaningfully
discuss the law. 230 Without facts, legal principles are of negligible
utility.
Experts anticipate questions the bench might have and relate the
facts to meet them. 23 ' But there is no guarantee that even an
impeccable statement of the facts will exhaust the court's curiosity
and one must be ready for all queries. Yet, without a doubt, a
superb performance here will reduce the number of judicial
interruptions, for most listeners will not be struggling with the facts,
the explanation for many queries. 23 2 A good tale not only
minimizes the need for questions but advances the cause
considerably, as Professor Llewellyn explains: "It is a question of
making the facts talk. . . . The court is interested not in listening to
any lawyer rant, but in seeing, or better, in discovering, from and in
the facts, where sense and justice lie." 23 3 Mr. Davis supports this
view, which again underlines the importance of this phase of the
argument, in these words: "[I]n many, probably in most, cases
when the facts are clear, there is no great trouble about the law.
' 23 4
seems to me that the bedrock of what the plaintiffs relied upon to be here is the
Jones case. First, starting off with Section 1981 and just going briefly, it says
that all persons within every state and territory to make and enforce contracts to
sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and
proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white
citizens.
Now, I will jump to the Jones case, because as I say, that seems to be the
foundation of private discrimination and, really, that is what I think we are here
on. Now, first, at the outset, I want to make this observation: Being of Greek
heritage, it is not a question of whether I agree or don't agree with restrictive
policies. I am here, as Mr. Justice Marshall used to in the old days, to support
individual rights in this battle to eliminate abuses. Well, I am here in support of
an individual right of a citizen in this country or any person in this country: the
right of privacy and the right to freely choose his associates.
229. Currie, supra, note 7 at 563; Weiner, supra, note 5 at 68; Wilkins, supra,
note 2 at 120. Judge Kaufman contends implicitly that master advocates and
spellbinding narrators share common ground. Supra, note 7 at 171
230. Wilkins, supra, note 2 at 120
231. Medina, supra, note 3 at 140-41
232. Weiner, supra, note 5 at 69
233. K. Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition: Deciding Appeals (1960) in
Rombauer, supra, note 7 at 173
234. Davis, supra, note 3 at 896. Mr. Justice Jackson indicates that the American
Supreme Court divides more often on the laws applicability to the facts, not what
the law ought to be. Supra, note 7 at 803. Judge Loughran confesses "that the
charm of a lucid fact presentation seems one of the best arguments of all." Supra,
note 7 at 5. See also Rall, supra, note t at 119
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One should not underestimate the considerable interest the highest
courts have in the facts.
A proper statement of the facts will be accurate, 235 complete,
candid 236 and sensibly ordered, the last factor alone the source of
some disagreement amongst the experts. Some favor a chronologi-
cal presentation, 237 the assumption being that such is the easiest to
grasp, 238 others would initially emphasize the essential facts and
elaborate subsequently, 239 and still others recommend a topic
division.
240
No respected advocate denies the obligation imposed upon the
profession to reveal all the important facts to the court, 2 4 1 and
should this duty be shirked, the respondent will, with particular
delight, remedy the omission. 242 If unethical conduct of this
description does not forfeit any claim to professionalism, these
gaps will certainly confuse the court, to the detriment of the
appellant, undermining as it will, the case.
24 3
However, with proper emphasis the merits of one side can
emerge. 2 44 This is not an invitation to deceive the court but simply
recognition that facts can be characterized many ways, some more
desirable than others, depending on the examiner's perspective.
Furthermore, emotive words which connote positive images can be
incorporated. 24 5 Just because reference to certain concepts will
235. Medina, supra, note 3 at 141
236. Davis, supra, note 3 at 897; O'Driscoll, supra, note 6 at 213
237. Davis, supra, note 2 at 897; Gordon, supra, note 7 at 448; Jackson, supra,
note 7 at 803; Medina, supra, note 3 at 140; Rail, supra, note 1 at 125
238. Mr. Davis notes that it is the natural way to tell a story. Supra, note 3 at 897.
Mr. Rail comments on the ease of composition. Supra, note I at 125
239. Weiner, supra, note 5 at 68
240. Jackson, supra, note 7 at 803
241. Currie, supra, note 7 at 563; Davis, supra, note 3 at 897; O'Driscoll, supra,
note 6 at 213
242. Wilkins, supra, note 2 at 121. After such a disclosure the court's confidence
in the appellant will disappear. Currie, supra, note 7 at 563
243. Davis, supra, note 3 at 897; Medina, supra, note 3 at 141
244. Davis, supra, note 3 at 897; O'Driscoll, supra, note 6 at 212
245. See Weiner, supra, note 5 at 64-65. The appellant in Runyon v. McCrary
(1976), 427 U.S. 160 maintained that an operator of a private school had the right
to select its own students using whatever standard it wished. Mr. Koutoulakos
argued that God, democracies and people who love children would see the merit in
his case. The following transcript is reproduced in 83 Landmark Briefs and
Arguments of the Supreme Court of the United States: Constitutional Law (1977)
859 at 868-69:
THE COURT: The state law doesn't give you the right to refuse Negroes.
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produce favourable associations in the judge's mind is no reason to
reject them. This is not sharp practice but common sense. 246 The
following passage, from McGrath v. Zander,24 7 where the court
had to decide if the respondent's marriage to a German national
made her an enemy alien, illustrates the potency of emotive words:
Appellee, a native born adult citizen of the United States, with
home and domicile in New Orleans, went to Germany in June,
1939 for a visit with her return passage booked for September 9,
1939. A train of fortuitous circumstances, starting with the
sudden invasion of Poland, delayed and finally prevented her
return. While so detained she fell in love with and married Dieter
Zander, a German citizen. . . . During hostilities between
Germany and the United States, Mrs. Zander was registered and
treated as an alien by German authorities and kept under constant
surveillance. 248
MR. KOUTOULAKOS: I am not saying that the state law gives us - I say that
insofar as a private individual is concerned - and I am, of course, taking the
position that the private school, that is, a purely private school, has the same
rights, and that is a right that is a personal right, that is a God-given right for you
to live with - and that is what I think separates the democracies from other
nations - that right to choose your associates, whom you want to bring in your
home, and to do as you see fit personally, as long as -
THE COURT: This isn't a home. A school is not a home.
MR. KOUTOULAKOS: It is a home in a sense that it is a private establishment
THE COURT: It is not a home.
THE COURT: Mr. Koutoulakos, could you tell us a little about this school, how
many students are there?
MR. KOUTOULAKOS: Yes, sir, they do. And it is a very fine school. As a
matter of fact, the man that runs it used to be - and his wife - were both at -
they are both fine people and love children. And let me make this observation
Judges of course have seen fit to employ this stratagem. In the Late Corporation of
Latter Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1 (1889), a case illustrating the
animosity between the American federal government and the Mormons, a Supreme
Court judge after describing polygamy as a "crime", a "barbarous practice" and a
'nefarious doctrine", put the question presented by the litigation this way: "The
question therefore is whether the promotion of such a nefarious system and
practice, so repugnant to our laws and to the principles of our civilization, is to be
allowed to continue by the sanction of the government itself; and whether the funds
accumulated for that purpose shall be restored to the same unlawful uses as
heretofore to the detriment of the true interests of civil society."
246. Judicial minds operate like all others and an advocate takes advantage of this
knowledge. Macmillan, supra, note 7 at 23
247. (1949), 177 F. 2d 649 (D.C. Cir.)
248. Id. at 650
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A statement like this is almost all an advocate needs to prevail. 249
How could a court decide against a woman who is the victim of war,
romance and intrigue?
If the appellant submits an accurate statement of facts the
respondent should accept it for a ponderous restatement wastes the
court time250 and ineffectively utilizes a dramatic segment of the
argument. Counsel's further usefulness will also be cast in doubt
should a repetitious statement be offered.
The court is now anxious to analyze the legal questions, and will
have, ever since the questions presented were paraded, anticipated
some of counsel's arguments. 251 This initial reference tends to
prompt the judges to review their knowledge of the delineated area.
Counsel can authenticate the court's suspicions by summarizing the
propositions which will be discussed. Some advocates like to give
the judges what amounts to an oral table of contents. This
framework gives the argument a sense of order. Leading advocates
do not hesitate to develop a different approach than that used in the
factum.252 A novel argument broached orally may be the outline
which leaves a lasting impression on the judicial mind. There are
other good reasons counsel should not be wedded to any specific
system, as Mr. Justice Jackson's admission shows:
I used to say that, as Solicitor-General, I made three arguments of
every case. First came the one that I planned - as I thought,
logical, coherent, complete. Second was the one actually
presented - interrupted, incoherent, disjointed, disappointing.
The third was the utterly devastating argument that I thought of
after going to bed at night. 253
Whatever enthusiasm counsel's opening engendered in the court,
an announcement that there are ten appealable points, will promptly
dissipate. 2 54 A presentation distinguished only by the numerous
grounds of appeal argued is unlikely to impress the court.2 55
249. Lord Macmillan has written that an artist "never argued his cases, he merely
stated them." Supra, note 7 at 25
250. Rombauer, supra, note 7 at 182; Currie, supra, note 7 at 563; Medina, supra,
note 3 at 142
251. Davis, supra, note 3 at 897
252. Currie, supra, note 7 at 564. Conversations with Mr. T. C. Wakeling, Q.C.
and Professor K.E. Norman confirm this. Judges also appreciate a fresh
perspective. Kaufman, supra, note 7 at 171
253. Supra, note 7 at 803
254. The converse though is also true, and the court's interest will escalate if
counsel informs them that argument is restricted to one or two points.
255. A fine screen may catch some arguments the court will find attractive but the
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Multiple complaints will certainly test the court's patience and a
profusion of alleged errors invites cursory coverage and judicial
boredom.2 56 A shot gun approach evidences counsel's doubts about
the merits of any one point which is not an admission counsel
should advertise. 257 Confident advocates are content to stress one or
two crucial issues,2 58 with some support in the writers for three.2 59
Mr. Rall encourages cursory coverage of every point but concedes
the need to marshal the forces behind the best propositions. 26 0 The
approach of Chief Justice Ellsworth is preferable, which is to
develop "the main points of the case, leaving the minor ones to shift
for themselves.' '261
Outstanding advocates "go for the jugular vein" 26 2 or "to the
heart of the problem". 263 The court welcomes boldness 264 and such
positive assertiveness leaves a permanent impression with the court.
When a judge writes his opinion these forceful submissions will
resurface. 265 As well, such selectivity inevitably moves the
respondent onto ground the appellant believes defensible, probably
with good reason.2 66 Indubitably, the respondent's maneuvering
space is reduced when the appellant marshals all resources around
one or two concepts. 2
67
This winnowing process identifies a limited number of sound
risk is worth running. Besides if a particular approach appeals to a judge he will
likely raise it whether counsel does or not. Doubtful points can be discussed with
associates whose frank opinions should make the selection decision easier. See
O'Driscoll, supra, note 6 at 214
256. Currie, supra, note 7 at 555; Kaufman, supra, note 7 at 169. A scattergun
mind may be avoided if it manifests itself in print but a judge does not have the
same evasive tactics when counsel is present. Davis, supra, note 3 at 897
257. Jackson, supra, note 7 at 802. Furthermore, this indiscriminate course shifts
some counsel tasks onto the court. Currie, supra, note 7 at 555
258. Davis, supra, note 3 at 897; Freedman, supra, note 7 at 309; Jackson, supra,
note 7 at 803; Kaufman, supra, note 7 at 169; Medina, supra, note 3 at 142
259. Rombauer, supra, note 7 at 181. Some commentators never give specific
guidelines but Mr. O'Driscoll does imply that more than two arguments are
acceptable. Supra, note 6 at 215. This limit may be adjusted in unusual appeals.
260. Supra, note 1 at 122
261. L.J. Bigelow, supra, note 40 at 118
262. Davis, supra, note 3 at 897
263. Freedman, supra, note 7 at 309
264. There are not many occasions where the victor lost the major proposition but
is triumphant because a secondary matter held the court.
265. Currie, supra, note 7 at 562; Medina, supra, note 3 at 142. (One solid blow is
more effective than peppering away.)
266. Davis, supra, note 3 at 897; Medina, supra, note 3 at 142
267. Davis, supra, note 3 at 897
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arguments and the next problem is to determine what order of
presentation is most advantageous. Lord Macmillan expects counsel
to interest the court from the outset but introduces this caveat,
"There is something to be said for keeping your best vintage till
your guests have been duly prepared for its reception." ' 268 But the
English judge stands alone; Canadian and American writers exhort
counsel to "step out with one's best foot forward" 2 69 - the
message of those who "go for the jugular vein".
Lord Macmillan's proposal raises several objections. First,
counsel might never have another chance to direct the course of
argument, and to forfeit the opportunity to argue a major point in the
manner the appellant deems best, is questionable. Second, why risk
implanting a negative mood when there is a stronger argument in
reserve. Third, counsel wants a receptive mind for the best point,
not one jaded by exposure to peripheral contentions. Besides, Lord
Macmillan's fear of weak endings can be met if the advocate
discards weak material and has a one or two pronged offence. With
such a narrow focus there is little danger the last argument will
prove anticlimactic.
The consensus then is that a limited number of legal themes be
argued and that the strongest be first. One next has to consider the
safest way to establish these legal themes. Suppose counsel
maintains in the Supreme Court of Canada that decisions not a
product of fair procedures can immediately be impugned regardless
of the availability of formal institutional appeal routes. Before
asking the court to overrule any Supreme Court decision counsel
will explore other alternatives with less traumatic implications.
2 7 0
This means that the path of least resistance will be followed first.
Imaginative advocates assert contentious arguments in their best
form. They outline discernible trends in the law and establish the
consistency of their solution therewith. 271 This approach em-
phasizes the reasonableness of a position which makes it more
attractive to the courts. 2 72 Professor Norman adopted this format in
268. Supra, note 7 at 29
269. Gordon, supra, note 7 at 449. Mr. O'Driscoll, Q.C. launches the strongest
argument first. Supra, note 6 at 215
270. Courts are reluctant to declare legislation unconstitutional, in contravention
of Bills of Rights or reconsider their own recent decisions. See Appleman, supra,
note 7 at 43. Traditional concepts are more appealing to the bench, but if these will
not suffice then the novel propositions must be relied on. Currie, supra, note 7 at
559
271. Currie, supra, note 7 at 558
272. See, Appleman, supra, note 7 at 43
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Harelkin, 273 arguing that administrative law trends were identifi-
able and favorale, that a troublesome Supreme Court case was
distinguishable, and only as a last resort did he ask for a
reconsideration of the prior decision.
If the court clearly is not sympathetic there is little to gain by
further discussion unless counsel is satisfied that the court does not
understand, as opposed to endorse, the position. 274 Those who
proceed in the face of judicial opposition simply antagonize their
listeners.
There are other ways to lose the court that are less desirable than a
judicial rebuff received during the course of a novel argument or an
attempt to invite judicial reconsideration. Judges do not appreciate
proponents of mechanistic jurisprudence who assume that the
weight of authority is determined by the number of cases cited.
275
Mass recitation of cases taxes the court and gives counsel the
reputation of having a "blunderbuss mind" .276 An effective
advocate recognizes the human limitations of judges and governs
his conduct accordingly. 277 Few persons can digest large numbers
of cases and retain anything meaningful. 278 Mr. Justice Currie
confirms this when he admits that "it is almost certain that not a
single case cited in argument either by name or volume and page
will have been remembered." 279 It follows then that counsel should
attempt to leave the judge with the dispute's salient features, which
makes the best use of a concrete number of available lasting images.
What is crucial is the legal principle involved, not the particular
cases lodged in the legal quiver. Therefore acknowledged leaders do
not distract the court with excessive case law. 28 0 The proper use of
273. (S.C.C. March 30, 1979) (unreported)
274. O'Driscoll, supra, note 6 at 216
275. Davis, supra, note 3 at 897
276. Jackson, supra, note 7 at 804
277. Mr. Davis describes the human mind as a "pawky thing". Supra, note 3 at
898. See Denecke, supra, note 7 at 361
278. Davis, supra, note 3 at 895
279. Currie, supra, note 7 at 562. But he states that the same fate does not befall
the statement of facts, the questions presented and the legal themes.
280. in Regina v. Hubbert (1975), 29 C.C.C. 2d 279 (Ont. C.A.) the court by its
own figures listened to over forty cases, which in the end appeared as an appendix
to the decision. Instead of a case by case analysis, the court considered the purpose
of jury challenges and" [s]ome broad principles respecting criminal trials by jury".
Chief Justice Culliton did not record any figures in Canadian Indus. Gas & Oil Ltd.
v. Saskatchewan, [1976] 2 W.W.R. 356 at 377 (Sask. C.A.) but suggested that it
was an unwieldy number in this passage: "Before concluding, I wish to make this
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judicial decisions281 is a valuable aid but its overuse bores the court.
Because nothing is more distracting and disruptive2 82 than
announcing a case citation, some lawyers never do this unless the
court makes a request.2 83 This information should be conveyed in
the factum, unless of course the release date of relevant opinions
followed the production date of the factum. 
284 a
Any court wants the best solutions and this obliges counsel to
survey the responses other jurisdictions have fashioned. This is
especially true if the issue is a novel one in the nation. 28 4 b Mr.
Justice Hugessen certainly is from this school, as his opinion in Re
Laporte and the Queen2 8 5 attests:
All parties before me readily concede that there is no precedent in
point that they have been able to find either in Canadian or British
case law. Petitioner invites me to conclude from this that the
answer to the question is so self-evident that it has never been
raised. I am not prepared to accept this argument. The law does
not stand still but must grow and change with the times. Simply
because something has never been done before is no good reason
observation in explanation of the fact that I have not referred to the many
authorities quoted by counsel."
281. Proficient practioners give the court the best cases and rely on them. Cite
forceful passages occasionally to drive home specific points, but do not read more
than this. Freedman, supra, note 7 at 306
282. Mr. Medina has firm views on the evils of oral case citation. "There is not
one chance in a thousand that the members of the court are going to remember the
names of these old cases, and the rigmirole of cases and citations is boring in the
extreme." Supra, note 3 at 142
283. Lord Macmillan and Mr. O'Driscoll, Q.C. disagree and only Lord
Macmillan's response can I explain. An English advocate relies little on written
work which makes the oral presentation the occasion for information transference.
However, with all respect, it makes much better sense to distribute to the court a list
of authorities relied upon, rather than to read from such a list, which Lord
Macmillan says counsel should have. Supra, note 7 at 26. Mr. O'Driscoll, Q.C.
expects counsel to laboriously parrot the citation even though they are present in the
factum. Supra, note 6 at 216. Professor Rombauer would be content with a factum
page reference where the case is discussed or cited. Rombauer, supra, note 7 at 181
284a. Opposing counsel should be given ample warning of counsel's intention to
introduce new cases. This follows from the premise that an appellate hearing is a
discussion between intellectual equals. Unless both counsel are familiar with the
case law the quality of the discussion will suffer. Advocates are gentlemen and
there is no place for this kind of one upmanship.
284b. In Regina v. Carswell (1974), 17 C.C.C. 2d 521 At 525 (Man. C.A.) a case
involving peaceful picketing during a labor dispute on shopping centre property
which the public had free access to, the majority looked to the American cases
because "[t]he precise issue . . . has not yet been dealt with by the Supreme Court
of Canada."
285. (1972), 8.C.C.C. 2d 343 (Que. Q.B.)
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to say that it should not be done now. I trust that the age of
judicial innovation is not dead and there will always be room to
extend the frontiers of jurisprudence. If the matter has not been
decided before, it falls to be decided now, and the absence of
precedent, while it renders my task more difficult, adds nothing
to the argument one way or the other.
What is more, even though there is no English or Canadian case
directly in point, the matter has arisen before in the United States
and, while not binding on me, the decisions of the courts of that
country may always be looked to for guidance. Indeed it is upon
the American jurisprudence that the main thrust of the
respondent's argument is founded, and it is to that jurisprudence
that I shall now turn.28
6
American case law binds no Canadian court but there is no reason
for dismissing it in the absence of harsh scrutiny. The principle of
stare decisis gives provincial courts of appeal freedom to strike
courses independent of their counterparts,28 7 yet such independence
does not mean other Canadian jurisdictions should be ignored. For
example, in the early 1960s when the Ontario and British Columbia
Courts of Appeal divided2 88 on the issue whether rape was a
specific intent offence, no British Columbia judge ever suggested
that it was unwise to examine Ontario's position.2 89 And any court
which adopted such a position would have been guilty of
chauvinism, and in dereliction of their judicial duties. Judge Borins
certainly shares this view for he states in Regina v. Shand, 290 "It is
my respectful opinion that it would be an abdication of my
responsibility if I were to turn a blind eye to judgments and other
materials that I find of assistance merely because they happen to
emanate from a jurisdiction or source not binding on me." 291 In
Regina v. Miller,292 where the validity of the death penalty was
challenged, Mr. Justice McIntyre necessarily made extensive use of
286. Id. at 347
287. MacGuigan, Precedent and Policy in the Supreme Court (1967), 45
Can.B.Rev. 627 at 651-52
288. Regina v. Vandervoort (1961), 130 C.C.C. 158 (Ont. C.A.) and Regina v.
Boucher, [1963] 2 C.C.C. 241 (B.C.C.A.) respectively.
289. In fact Mr. Justice Sheppard perused the Ontario decision and announced it
was "with every regret" that the Ontario lead was found unacceptable. R. v.
Boucher, [1963] 2 C.C.C. 241 at 252 (B.C.C.A.)
290. (1976), 29 C.C.C. 2d 199 (Ont. Cty. Ct.)
291. Id. at 211-12. Canadian labor arbitrators do not work in a legal vacuum even
though prior arbitration awards are not binding precedent. D. Brown and D.
Beatty, Canadian Labour Arbitration (Agincourt: Canadian Law Books, 1977) at
166
292. (1975), 24 C.C.C. 2d 401 (B.C.C.A.)
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American jurisprudence, because he "found it helpful in seeking
principles upon which this matter should be considered in a civilized
society." ' 293 Chief Justice Laskin also devoted considerable
attention to the American authorities confident of their relevance,
when hearing the Miller appeal. 294 He recognized that certain
features of the American constitution had no parallel in the
Canadian context but concluded that the dissimilarities were not
significant. 295 What is important is the effect these differences have
on a given case, not the fact that there are differences. 2 96 If the
similarities are compelling, the dissimilarities inconsequential, then
293. Id. at 465
294. (1976), 31 C.C.C. 2d. 177 (S.C.C.)
295. Id. at 185
296. Mr. Justice McIntyre explains, "The differences between the American
constitutional system and our own are many and obvious. . . .It does not follow,
however, that all judicial attitudes and expressions emanating from the United
States are inapplicable in Canada." Regina v. Miller (1975), 24 C.C.C. 2d 401,
460 (B.C.C.A.). Lord Darling would certainly subscribe to this view for in Senior
v. Holdsworth, ex. p. Independent Television News Ltd., [1976] 1 Q.B. 23, 34
(C.A. 1975), a case involving the obligation of news services to disclose evidence,
the American attempt to balance competing interests was studied. Mr. Justice
Ritchie though refuses to discuss the American case law because the Canadian Bill
of Rights and the United States Constitution "differ so radically in their purpose
and content that judgments rendered in interpretation of one are of little value in
interpreting the other." Unfortunately the crucial explanation of what the radical
differences are and their subsequent impact on this analysis are absent. Regina v.
Miller (1976), 31 C.C.C. 2d 177, 198 (S.C.C.). For an explanation why American
case law can be inadequate see Gad Ben-Izhak Yosifof v. The Attorney General
(1950), 1 Selected Judgments of the Supreme Court of Israel 174 at 184-85 and
Narayanan Nambudripad v. Madras, 54 A.I.R. 385 (Madras H.C. 1954). In the
latter case the court had to decide whether the State of Madras could take over
control of the Karikkat temple without violating the religious articles of the Indian
Constitution. The hereditary trustees of the denomination maintained that such
legislation was an unconstitutional breach of separation of church and state
doctrine. American case law was utilized by the challengers and the decision
makers dealt with it fully before declining to follow the United States lead. They
were satisfied that the Indian Constitution adopted something less than the "wall of
separation" argument. What is worthy of note is not the outcome, which was
predictable given the explicit nature of the relevant provisions, but the receptive
attitude the court displayed to the carefully prepared arguments. For an explanation
of the theoretical differences between the Canadian and American Bills of Rights
see Driedger, The Meaning and Effect of the Canadian Bill of Rights: A
Draftsman's Viewpoint, 9 Ottawa L. Rev. 303 (1977). Unless a lawyer can justify
his failure to look elsewhere the omission might be construed as "a facile excuse to
avoid further study." Janisch, Book Review, 4 Dalhousie L.J. 825, 826 (1978).
Professor Tarnopolsky has sharply criticized the Ritchie approach to comparative
law. A New Bill of Rights in the Light of the Interpretation of the Present One by
the Supreme Court of Canada, 1978 Special Lectures of the Law Society of Upper
Canada 166, 177-81.
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there is utility in conducting the foreign survey. It goes without
saying that the same rules govern use of non-American foreign
material as well.
It is true that judges display varying degrees of enthusiasm for
foreign cases, but the general trend is discernible. 297 Canadian
Supreme Court judges use them and more lower courts all the time
are sensitive to the dangers of parochialism. 298 The courts should
welcome new ideas, wherever they originate. Mr. Justice Dickson's
scholarly opinion in The Queen v. The City of Sault Ste. Marie299 in
which he taps the collective wisdom of judges, lawyers and
academics from England, Australia, New Zealand, United States
and Canada, is an excellent example of the emerging pattern. This
opinion makes it abundantly clear, if it was not before, why counsel
does not apologize for being thorough,3 0 0 a trait generally regarded
as commendable .301
Mr. Justice Dickson's extensive treatment of periodicals and
treatises emphasizes the rewards available for diligent persons who
explore this rich realm. As a general rule, authors have some
expertise which allows them insights others less familiar with the
topic are without.30 2 Even if these sources are never cited the
297. With respect, the hesitation of some may reflect a lack of familiarity with the
research aids. Professor Janisch echoes this thought: "To some extent this [neglect
of American law] is because the very sophistication and complexity of that law
makes occasional unorganized forays and serendipitous research intimidating
. . . . Supra, note 296. Cohen, How to Find the Law (7 ed. St. Paul, Minn.:
West, 1976) is an excellent remedial source, which focuses on American,
Canadian, English and international research tools. The level of enthusiasm should
depend on the quality and quantity of Canadian material on the subject. See
Thibodeau v. The Queen, [1955] S.C.R. 646 at 654-55
298. Some courts long ago recognized the assistance foreign jurisprudence offers.
See Rex v. Naish, [1950] 1 W.W.R. 987 (Sask. Mag. Ct.) where American and
Australian judgments were considered, along with the United Nations Charter of
Human Rights, in interpreting the Saskatchewan Bill of Rights. Cases can also be
cited where foreign courts have sought assistance outside their borders. For
example, the Supreme Court of Victoria in determining the limits of the duress
defence studied the law in Canada and the United States. The Queen v. Hurley,
[19671 V.R. 526 at 533-34, 542-43. In State v. Clark, (1968) 104 N.J. Super 67;
248 A 2d 559 the court looked elsewhere to determine the effect improper medical
procedure had on the culpability of an alleged murderer.
299. (1978), 21 N.R. 295 (S.C.C.)
300. In Regina v. Shand (1976), 30 C.C.C. 2d 23 at 35 (Ont. C.A.) Mr. Gold
compared the relevant Canadian statute with those from the United Kingdom and
Australia drawing the Ontario Court of Appeals' approbation.
301. Professor Gibson applauds Mr. Justice Dickson's thoroughness in
Unobtrusive Justice (1974) 12 Osgoode Hall L.J. 339
302. Denecke, supra, note 7 at 362
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perspective they provide might be very useful, especially if the
problem involves freshly broken ground. 30
3
Advocates often wonder what background information to give the
court. 30 4 No one wishes to appear condescending which would
happen if material all too familiar to the court was examined, 305 but
at the same time, an advocate is not prepared to risk losing judges
on matters with which they are not conversant. 306 This is a real
dilemma on occasion.
30 7
Should counsel simply sketch in underlying principles there is
little danger the court will be offended. Judges who are comfortable
in the area will manifest this condition and waive counsel on. If red
lights, ordering counsel to terminate the preliminaries, are not
flashing, counsel can with some safety proceed. There is always the
danger though on a multipartite court that the tolerance level of
some judges will be reached before others.
Common sense indicates that there is no need to review
authorities the court knows.30 8 The court's own recent works 309
and other classic opinions will fall within this class. There are no
precise rules, of course, and counsel must monitor the judicial
reception accorded the presentation. This, as noted above, partly
explains why readers labor under such disadvantages and are so
intensely depised. 310 Statutes are another matter and judges will not
complain about detailed coverage - most experts strongly advise
counsel to read statutory material. 31'
The following summarize some of the important points made in
303. Janisch, supra, note 296. For example, see Mr. Justice Dickson's use of
academic writing in Morgentaler v. The Queen (1975), 20 C.C.C. 2d 449 at 497
(S.C.C.)
304. Mr. O'Driscoll, Q.C. would attempt to solve the problem by asking the court
how familiar it was with the material. A unanimous response regardless of what
form it takes will assist somewhat, but is this a likely or realistic expectation.
Besides, is it counsel's place to ask this question. Some would give a negative
answer, but if the appeal is a discussion there is nothing objectionable about polite
inquiries on the subject.
305. S.T. Bigelow, supra, note 7 at 30; Jackson, supra, note 7 at 804
306. Jackson, supra, note 7 at 804
307. To this the famous English barrister, Mr. F. E. Smith can attest. He was
interrupted by the court while belaboring an obvious point. "Do give this court
credit for some little intelligence, Mr. Smith." His famous reply: "That is the
mistake I made in the court below, my lord." S. Jackson, supra, note 40 at 75
308. Levitan, supra, note 7 at 66
309. Jackson, supra, note 7 at 804
310. See the next associated with notes 196-208
311. See the text associated with note 205
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relation to the establishment of legal themes: The best advocates 1)
use the factum for a complete exposition of the case law, 3 12 2)
forward sensible resolutions and use authorities sparingly to justify
their position, 3 13 and 3) attempt to show that both justice and the
law favor their position, 31 4 in that the legal themes advanced are fair
and govern the fact pattern.
3 15
What constitutes good advice for the appellant usually is that for
the respondent. This means primarily that the latter keep in mind the
aspects the judges will be interested in and that everything an
advocate does is designed to produce the desired effect.3 16 There
are, however, some exceptions which are obvious. For example, as
noted earlier, 3 17 a full and fair statement of the facts relieves the
respondent of this task. 3 18 "A long repetitious rehashing of the
facts" wearies the court with the attendant danger their interest will
wane. 31 9 The respondent should do no more than correct misleading
portions of the appellant's statement. 
3 20
In the exordium the respondent should place the matter in the
mould favorable to his side. Just as the appellant fashioned a
sympathetic "question presented", so should the respondent, if the
312. Rombauer, supra, note 7 at 181; Freedman, supra, note 7 at 306; Wilkins,
supra, note 2 at 123. Mr. Davis warns advocates that "after three or four or half a
dozen such recitals [of cases] that not only are the recited facts forgotten but those
in the case at bar become blurred .... " Supra, note 3 at 898. Besides as Lord
Coke perceptively stated, "In such a farrago of authorities it cannot be but there is
much refuse."
313. Freedman, supra, note 7 at 306; Rall, supra, note I at 128
314. Denecke, supra, note 7 at 358-59. For this reason, a clever respondent with
strong procedural arguments, will not rest the case on that ground alone, but will
explain why the merits favor his side as well. Kaufman, supra, note 7 at 168-69.
Appellant's opening in Washington v. Davis (1976), 426 U.S. 229 illustrates the
point in a different context. The following transcript is reproduced in 88 Landmark
Briefs and Arguments of the Supreme Court of the United States: Constitutional
Law (1977) 353 at 355:
MR. SUTTON: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court:
At its threshold, this case presents two highly important social values - the
right of a community to be free from discrimination in public employment and
the right of a community to a competent police force. It is our position that both
of these values may be rationally upheld in this case.
315. Anderson, supra, note 7 at 707
316. See the text associated with notes 211-13 and Jackson, supra, note 7 at 303;
Kaufman, supra, note 7 at 169
317. Supra, note 250
318. Id.
319. Medina, supra, note 3 at 142
320. Id. at 143
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two versions are not identical. Counsel should then develop selected
legal themes and that done attack the appellant's position where it is
profitable to do so. 32 1 There is certainly no advantage in joining
issue on all matters when victory depends on the court's response to
one or two points.
322
Differences of opinion exist here and one school favors training
initial firepower at the weaknesses of the appellant's major
propositions. The exigencies of the situation will determine
counsel's tactics, but this approach might keep the respondent on
the defensive. This will not do for the respondent must build a case
the court can accept. 323 It is undeniable though that a mobile strike
force can do considerable damage to the appellant's framework. If
adequately prepared counsel can range broadly, answering
questions the court asked the appellant, clarifying the record and
exposing the weakness of the petitioner's argument.
But should the situation require it this suggested order can be
abandoned. 324 Should the appellant sit down with the court most
anxious to hear the respondent on a particular question, a lawyer
would be foolish to adhere to a planned response.
In short, the respondent must have the ability to evaluate
developments and respond accurately and immediately.3 25 With-
out a perfect knowledge of the record and the law counsel will be
unable to make the appropriate adjustments.
The appellant has the right to reply but this opportunity can safely
be declined and most experts do if the respondent has not introduced
new dimensions to the case. 326 The reply is not there to serve as a
review mechanism for the appellant,32 7 and if the advocate realizes




Some lawyers think that oral argument is the easiest part of the
321. Weiner, supra, note 5 at 64
322. Medina, supra, note 3 at 142. Furthermore, if the appellant has the court with
him on a point he can devote little time to the subject. Rail, supra, note 1 at 133
323. Id.
324. Weiner, supra, note 5 at 67
325. Rail, supra, note 1 at 132-33; Weiner, supra, note 4 at 74
326. Jackson, supra, note 7 at 804. At this stage of the struggle counsel should
know both sides equally well.
327. O'Driscoll, supra, note 6 at 217
328. Davis, supra, note 3 at 898; Freedman, supra, note 7 at 309; Wilkins, supra,
630 The Dalhousie Law Journal
appeal. That it is the most satisfying and exhilarating there is little
doubt, 329 but that it is the easiest party of the appellate process is
debatable. I have heard counsel emotionally and physically drained
by the encounter comment "that it is almost like giving birth". That
is a compelling analogy given counsel's role in the development of
case law, and as such it is not inaccurate then to describe the
advocate as the midwife of the court. Thus, even if oral argument is
the easiest component of the appellate presentation, its importance,
like that of the midwife's, cannot be denied.
note 2 at 123. Lord Chief Justice Earle put it this way: "Mr. So and So, there is a
time in every man's mind at which he lets down the floodgates of his
understanding, and allows not one more drop to enter, and that time in my mind has
fully arrived." L.J. Bigelow, supra, note 40 at 369
329. Robinette, supra, note 7
